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Introduction 
 
South Africa’s dramatic conversion to democracy has been heralded as a modern-day 
miracle. In former Nobel peace prize winner Archbishop Tutu’s words, it was ‘touch 
and go’ whether all conflicting parties would participate in the first non-racial elections 
in April 1994. The ‘rainbow nation’, as the new South Africa liked to call itself in the first 
years of democracy, was heralded as a beacon of hope and enlightenment for Africa 
and the world.  
Since 1994, South Africa has successfully conducted two further national elections 
that have been declared essentially free and fair. The country has emerged as a 
leading representative of the economic and political interests of developing countries 
and the South in the international arena. The question is whether living under demo-
cracy has influenced the manner in which South Africans see themselves, their 
country and the world around them.  
This report seeks to document how South Africans think and feel some eight years 
into democracy about issues that are important in their own lives and have significance 
for the future of their society. The study covers personal experiences, attitudes and 
beliefs, and the aspirations and fears of ordinary people. It seeks to identify the senti-
ments and collective experiences that may contribute to or hinder the consolidation of 
democracy in years to come.   
The report is based on an inquiry conducted in March 2002 among over two 
thousand South African adults over 16 years of age in a nationally representative 
MarkData survey that included all regions of the country.  
The 2002 survey follows on a series of opinion polls conducted in South Africa that 
contribute to a larger project that has assessed the prospects of South Africa 
transforming into a democratic society. The project was launched by Theodor Hanf 
some thirty years ago. All attitude surveys conducted for the South African democracy 
project have been conducted by the same company, MarkData, using an identical 
survey design to aid comparability across space and time. Respondents are 
interviewed in their own homes in their language of choice by trained interviewers.    
The South African democracy project is a longitudinal study. The initial attitude 
survey for the South African democracy project led by Theodor Hanf and his team was 
conducted in the late 1970s. Results were reported in a book with the prescient title of 
‘prospects of peaceful change’.
1
 The euphoria that gripped the country in the month 
after the first democratic elections was captured in a survey conducted one month 
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 6 
after April 1994 elections.
2
 Reconciliation in the rainbow nation was assessed in 
further rounds of surveys carried out in the 1990s.
3
 The study reported here is based 
on the first survey conducted for the South African democracy project in the new 
millennium.   
The South African democracy project is part of a much larger international pro-
gramme of research on democracy led by Theodor Hanf. The international  research 
programme covers over a dozen countries that have only recently experienced the 
change-over to democracy or are in transition to democracy. One of the aims of the 
international democracy study is to identify the factors that play a role in easing the 
transition to democracy in multicultural societies such as South Africa. Education is 
one such factor thought to play a leading role in promoting democracy. 
The report that follows starts with an introduction to South African society as re-
corded in the composition of the sample drawn for the survey. Further chapters review 
attitudes relating to a wide range of domains, including the psychosocial, the economy, 
religion and personal identity, politics, democracy, and overall subjective well-being. 
The conclusions comment on recurring themes and the role of education as a force for 
promoting democracy in South Africa.   
 
                                                 
2
  Møller, V. & Hanf, Th. 1995. Learning to Vote. Indicator Press, University of Natal, Durban. 
3
  Møller, V., Dickow, H. & Harris, M. 1999. South Africa’s ‘rainbow nation’, national pride and 
happiness. Social Indicators Research 47: 245-280; and Dickow, H. & Møller, V. 2002. 
South Africa’s ‘rainbow people’, national pride and optimism: a trend study. Social Indi-
cators Research 59(2): 175-202. 
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Social and Cultural Markers –  
Analysis of a Sample Survey 
 
 
Attitudes and opinions are shaped by a variety of demographic, geographic and cultural 
factors. Survey analysts routinely check whether differences of opinion and outlook are 
determined by factors such as age, gender, urban and rural residence, and partici-
pation in the economy. Yet demographics may not suffice to explain all differences in 
social and political attitudes. 
This is particularly true of a society such as South Africa which embraces a rich 
diversity of peoples and a history of division between these peoples. Thus, it will be 
equally important to take cultural markers such as race or ethnicity, language and 
religion into consideration in any discussion of factors shaping people's attitudes and 
beliefs. 
The MarkData survey conducted in March 2002 shows where South Africa’s socio-
economic and cultural markers fit into the mosaic of South Africa’s society and how 
they are distributed geographically. The socio-economic and cultural markers used in 
our study are introduced below in the first section of this chapter. Their interrelation-
ships are reviewed in the second section which discusses how cultural markers reflect 
the equalisation of opportunity in a once deeply divided society under apartheid.  
 
Social and economic variance 
 
Of the 2164 respondents, 47 percent are men and 53 percent are women.  
The age distribution, which is a favourable match with official statistics, is as follows 
(in percent
4
): 
 
16-17 years 7 
18-24 years 22 
25-34 years 26 
35-49 years 24 
50 + years 22 
                                                 
4
  Applies to all tables, unless otherwise indicated. Distributions add to 100% or nearest due to 
rounding. 
  
 
 8 
The sample included persons 16 years of age and over. As South Africans are eligible 
to vote with 18 years, younger respondents are placed in a separate category for 
analysis purposes.  
South Africa is a young population. Half of the respondents in the sample are 35 
years or younger and only some 17 percent are over 55 years of age. 
After the 1994 elections, the country was divided into nine provinces. The sample is 
distributed as follows over the new provinces created after the first democratic 
elections. 
 
Western Cape 11 
Northern Cape  2 
Eastern Cape 14 
Free State 7 
KwaZuluNatal 20 
Mpumalanga 7 
Limpopo
5
 10 
Gauteng 21 
North West 8 
 
The three provinces with the largest populations are Gauteng, KwaZuluNatal and the 
Eastern Cape which is reflected in the subsample sizes. KwaZuluNatal incorporates 
the former homeland of the Zulus and the Eastern Cape encompasses the Ciskei and 
Transkei homelands divided by the mighty Kei River. The Northern Cape, which is 
mainly arid, has the lowest population density. Gauteng Province is the melting pot, 
where all languages and cultures mingle freely in a cosmopolitan atmosphere. The two 
richest provinces in terms of their contributions to the nation’s Gross National Product 
are Gauteng and the Western Cape. Gauteng is South Africa’s commercial centre 
which emerged from gold mining enterprises in the 19
th
 century. The province includes 
Johannesburg, known locally as Egoli, or the city of gold, and Pretoria, South Africa's 
capital. Pretoria’s main architectural landmarks are the houses of parliament and the 
University of South Africa, the largest distance-learning university in southern Africa. 
The Western Cape includes the mother city of Cape Town where parliament meets for 
half of the year. The first settlers from Europe landed on the shores of what was to 
become the Cape Colony in the 17
th
 century. Table Mountain towers over Cape 
Town's major landmarks, the houses of parliament and the Anglican cathedral. It is on 
the cathedral steps that anti-apartheid protest movements clashed with the police 
during their demonstrations in the seventies.   
                                                 
5
  Limpopo was still called the Northern Province at the time of the survey. 
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Under the past government, South Africa was divided into four provinces with a 
scattering of rural homelands assigned to blacks
6
 where land was held in trust for 
them. The homelands were excluded from official statistics which created a false 
picture of socio-economic indicators and cultural markers. Blacks living in the home-
lands typically survived on subsistence agriculture, remittances from wage earners 
working in the urban-industrial centres of the economy, and government transfers in 
the form of the near-universal non-contributory state old-age pension. Until the 
abolition of the notorious pass laws in 1986, blacks were expected to return to their 
respective rural homelands at the end of a working life. Only in urban areas such as 
Soweto, near Johannesburg in Gauteng Province, were they allowed to live out their 
lives in place. Soweto refers to the cluster of black townships near Johannesburg 
which served as dormitory suburbs for black workers in the open economy. As far back 
as the late seventies, the authorities reluctantly recognised that many Sowetans had 
no rural homeland to which they could return. Although townships like Soweto were 
considered an exception, they increasingly became the norm after the pass laws were 
removed.  
The spatial distribution of the sample by type of settlement is as follows: 
 
Tribal 23 
Rural 15 
Cities and small towns 5 
Squatters, shack settlements 7 
Hostels 4 
Former black townships 24 
Former coloured townships 8 
Former Indian townships 3 
Metropolitan areas 14 
 
In the sample, slightly fewer than four in ten are urban-based. Rural respondents are 
divided into those who reside in the tribal areas of the former homelands and those in 
the rural common area. Squatters, hostel and township dwellers are resident in urban 
centres.  
The sample is distributed across occupational rank as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
6
  The term 'black' is used here as synonym for 'African'. Both terms are in official use although 
Statistics South Africa currently uses the designation 'African'. Some South Africans take 
exception to the exclusive use of the latter term arguing that all peoples living on the African 
continent are Africans.  
  
 
 10
Highest ranking occupations  2 
Medium ranking occupations  6 
Clerical and sales 6 
Skilled manual and routine white collar 1 
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual 26 
Economically inactive 60 
 
The majority of the working population is employed in the lower occupational ranks 
and has limited work skills. The economically inactive constitute the single largest 
occupational category with the following composition:  
 
Unemployed 27 
Students and pupils 14 
Retired persons and pensioners 14 
Housewives, home makers 5 
Total economically inactive 60 
 
The proportion of the unemployed among the economically inactive exceeds that of 
housewives/homemakers and students and learners. A third of respondents between 
the ages of 18 and 49 years state they are unemployed. The official unemployment 
rate in February 2002 according to Statistics South Africa is 29.4% according to the 
official definition and 40.9% according to the expanded definition which includes dis-
couraged workseekers (Fast Facts, November 2002, South African Institute of Race 
Relations, SAIRR, 2002:9) 
The highest-ranking occupations are to be found in the metropolitan areas. Resi-
dents of metropolitan areas account for only 14 percent of the sample total but occupy 
about a third of the highest-ranking positions in society. About four-fifths of the res-
pondents from the tribal areas are economically inactive. Under the former govern-
ment, the tribal areas were considered labour reserves. Some 38 percent of respon-
dents in tribal areas indicate they are unemployed and a further 21 percent state they 
are retired.  
South Africa’s economy has shifted from primary production in mining and agri-
culture to services as is evident in the distribution of occupational sectors in the 
sample.  
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Professional, semi- and technical  4 
Managerial, executives and administrative  1 
Clerical and sales  7 
Transport, delivery and communication 3 
Services 14 
Farmers, fishermen, hunters and farm workers 6 
Artisans and apprentices 2 
Miners, quarrymen, production foremen and supervisors,  
operators, production workers and related 
3 
Economically inactive 60 
 
Surprisingly, not a single respondent in the tribal areas state they are farmers, which 
suggests that subsistence farming is not a viable occupation there. In contrast, the 
dominant occupation of respondents in the rural areas outside the former homelands 
is agriculture, with 41 percent stating they are employed as farmers/farm workers,  
The distribution of the sample by level of education is as follows: 
  
Up to Grade 5 28 
Grade 6-7 13 
Grade 8-9 17 
Grade 10-11 17 
Grade 12 12 
Grade 12 or more 12 
 
Educational achievement is skewed toward the lower levels. Over one quarter of the 
sample has gained less than 5 years of formal education. Grade 12 is the year in 
which South Africans take a matriculation examination. A matriculation pass is con-
sidered the minimum requirement for most jobs beyond the most menial ones. Just 
under one quarter of the sample has completed secondary education. Only some 12 
percent have gained some higher education in teacher or technical training institutions 
or at a university. An encouraging sign is that illiteracy is concentrated in the older 
generation. Some 55 percent of respondents 50 years and older have received no 
formal education. Among 18-24 year-olds, 38 percent have gained a Grade 12 level or 
higher education compared to 14 percent among persons over fifty.    
Educational achievement and occupational rank are closely associated. The vast 
majority of respondents in professional and managerial occupations, some 78 percent, 
have higher educational qualifications. The majority of the persons with no education 
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are employed in the service sector. The unemployed have an educational profile 
similar to the sample average but half as many have obtained a higher education.   
As with education, the distribution of the sample by monthly household and personal 
income is skewed towards lower earnings. A substantial proportion of respondents 
refused to disclose their income or was uncertain of the amount earned in the house-
hold. Approximately half of the respondents living in the former homelands, townships 
and squatter camps report no personal income. The chances of earning an income 
and escaping unemployment increases with age.  
 
Monthly household 
income (gross) 
  Monthly personal 
income (gross) 
 
No income 4  No income 37 
No information  20  No information 8 
     
R1-579 24  R1-579 27 
R580-1659 27  R580-1659 16 
R1660+ 24  R1660+ 12 
 
To give readers an idea of income levels cited above, the monthly average minimum 
wage excluding agricultural and domestic workers is R2691 in 2002 (Fast Facts, 
November 2002, SAIRR, 2002:9). According to a study published by Statistics South 
Africa in September 2000, some 29 percent of South African households were living in 
poverty based on a poverty line of R800 a month. Gauteng and the Western Cape 
provinces had the lowest levels of poverty (SAIRR, 2001:372). In the year of the sur-
vey, the non-contributory state old-age pension, a major source of income for poor 
households, was worth R620.   
The highest earners in South African society occupy professional and managerial 
positions, followed by artisans, transport and communication workers, miners, and 
service workers. Agricultural workers tend to earn least; some 70 percent earn R579 or 
less per month. 
 
Cultural variance 
 
Under apartheid, South Africans were obsessed by race. Under democracy, race 
continues to be an important marker of social status and social change. The post-
apartheid South African census asks the enumerated to state their race in terms of the 
population groups of Black/African, coloured, Indian or Asian, white and other. The 
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categorisation will have a familiar ring to most South Africans as it refers back to the 
race classification imposed on citizens according to the Population Registration Act 
passed in 1950. However, importantly, racial identity is a matter of choice in the new 
era. The census asks people to self-categorise with the cue: "How would the person 
describe him/herself in terms of population group?"   
The sample distribution on race is as follows. 
 
Black/African 78 
Coloured 9 
Indian 3 
White 10 
 
Blacks constitute over three quarters of the population and now enjoy majority rule. 
The African National Congress has successfully been elected to lead the country in 
the first open elections of 1994 and again in the second and third national elections of 
1999 and 2004.   
The respondents speak the following languages at home: 
 
Home languages  
IsiZulu
1 
21 Nguni: 
IsiXhosa
1
 16 
 Swazi 2 
 Ndebele 2 
Afrikaans  15 
Afrikaans & English  3 
English  11 
Western Sotho/ Setswana
1
 10 
Northern Sotho / Sepedi
1
 8 
Sotho: 
Southern Sotho / Sesotho
1
 8 
XiTsonga
1
  4 
Tshivenda
1
  2 
1
  For ease of reference, the text and tables to follow may refer simply   
to Zulu; Xhosa; Western, Northern and Southern Sotho; Tswana, 
Pedi, Tsonga; and Venda. 
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In the democratic era, South Africa recognises eleven official languages: English and 
Afrikaans and nine African languages. Ethnic and language groupings overlap. The 
ten former homelands were home to specific tribes with their own language. The Nguni 
languages of Zulu, spoken mainly in KwaZuluNatal Province, and Xhosa, spoken 
mainly in the Eastern Cape, are the most common languages, followed by Afrikaans 
which was brought to South Africa by Dutch settlers in the 17
th
 century. Although 
English is the lingua franca used in business and communication, it is the mother 
tongue of only a minority, mainly descendants of the 1820 settlers in the Eastern Cape 
Province and the settlers who arrived in the 19
th
 century on the shores of the port later 
known as Durban in KwaZuluNatal Province. Only one in ten South Africans speak 
English as their first language. 
The vast majority of blacks speak an African language; of which Zulu, Xhosa and 
the three Sotho languages are the most widely spoken. Less than 5 percent of blacks 
speak English or Afrikaans as a home language.  
The coloured people in the Cape region are mainly descendants of Malay slaves 
brought to the Cape Colony in the 17
th
 century. Some 71 percent of coloureds in the 
sample speak Afrikaans and a further 17 percent are bilingual and speak English and 
Afrikaans.  
The vast majority of Indians speak English as their home language, some 93 
percent. Less than 5 percent are fluent in the Indian languages spoken by their 
forebears when they immigrated to South Africa in the 19
th
 century.   
The white population is divided into Afrikaans and English speakers: approximately 
55 percent speak Afrikaans, and 36 percent speak English. A further 7 percent are 
bilingual.    
In advance of the detailed discussion on the interrelationships between cultural and 
socio-economic markers in the next section, it should be noted that, given South 
Africa's history of social exclusion, the English and Afrikaans languages are indications 
of distinct socio-economic advantage. English and Afrikaans speakers occupy some 
60 percent of professional and managerial positions. The two language groups are 
over-represented among the higher income earners. Some 63 percent of English 
speakers and 46 percent of Afrikaans speakers report household incomes in the 
highest survey category.  
South Africa’s cultural diversity is evident in the religious makeup of its people. 
Respondents are members of the following religious denominations: 
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Mainline Christian churches 14 
Dutch Reformed churches 12 
Anglican Church 6 
Roman Catholic 9 
Baptist Church 2 
Charismatic churches 20 
Religious movements 5 
African Independent Churches (AIC) 20 
Islam 2 
Hinduism 1 
None 9 
 
The older established churches of South Africa include the various Dutch Reformed 
Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Anglican Church as well as other 
mainline Christian protestant churches. The congregations of the well-established 
mainline protestant Christian churches, represented by Methodists, Lutherans, Con-
gregationalists, and Episcopalians, among others, are outnumbered by those attracted 
to the newer Charismatic churches. Charismatic churches include the Apostolic Faith 
Mission, the Rhema Church, the Assembly of God, the Full Gospel Church and 
various other evangelical and revivalist denominations. The Baptist Church and reli-
gious movements such as the Salvation Army, the Seventh Day Adventists, and the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, have a substantial following. Islam and Hinduism are minority 
religions. Just under one in ten in the sample did not indicate a religious denomination. 
It is possible that this category includes religious traditionalists as well as non-be-
lievers and persons who did not wish to disclose their religious persuasion. 
The Charismatic group of churches and the African Independent Churches have 
the largest following. The African Independent Churches embrace a very wide 
assortment of separatist churches of the Zionist and Ethiopian persuasions. Many of 
these churches operate without church structures and their members assemble in 
private homes or in public open spaces. The most prominent of the African Inde-
pendent Churches is the Zion Christian Church, which has its headquarters in the 
Limpopo Province. Over the long Easter weekend, over one million believers gather 
from around the country for their annual meeting which takes place in the open air.  
Religious denomination reflects social status in line with the ethnic make-up of 
religionists. Members of the African Independent Churches, religious movements, and 
the Charismatic churches are more likely to have no income, while members of the 
Dutch Reformed churches, Hindus and Muslims tend to be among the higher income 
earners. Best educated are members of the Dutch Reformed churches, Hindus and 
Muslims. The highest percentages of poorly educated are found among members of 
the Charismatic and African Independent Churches, and among persons with no 
religious persuasion.  
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Anglicans, Dutch Reformed, Catholics, Muslims and Hindus in the survey are over-
represented in the ranks of professionals and managers in the economy. The highest 
proportion of unemployed is found among Roman Catholics, members of Charismatic 
churches, African Independent Churches and religious movements. Although numbers 
are small, over one-quarter of Muslims are not economically active housewives, which 
might be taken as an indication of the stricter division of labour between men and 
women in Muslim households.  
A higher proportion of men than women are members of the patriarchal Dutch 
Reformed churches, 56 percent compared to 44 percent. More men than women, 74 
percent versus 26 percent, did not indicate a religious persuasion. Women are more 
likely than men to be members of religious movements (65%) and the African 
Independent Churches (59%).   
Blacks are mainly affiliated to the African Independent Churches (25%) and the 
Charismatic churches (20%), and the established mainline Christian churches (16%). 
One in ten blacks in the survey said they did not belong to any religious denomination. 
It is possible that some religious traditionalists are included in this residual category.  
Coloured respondents are mainly members of charismatic churches (35%) and the 
Dutch Reformed churches (25%). Indians are predominantly Muslims (41%) or Hindus 
(35%). Whites are predominantly members of the Dutch Reformed churches (45%) 
and the mainline Christian churches (10%). An above-average proportion of blacks 
(83%) are Roman Catholic. Above-average proportions of coloureds (16%) and whites 
(15%) are Anglicans.  
Given their numerical majority in the South African population, blacks make up the 
largest proportion of members of all religious denominations. Exceptions are Hinduism, 
Islam and the Dutch Reformed Churches. Hindus are exclusively Indian. Three 
quarters of Muslims are Indian, the remainder coloureds. The Dutch Reformed Church, 
established by the Afrikaners, has a following which is 43 percent black, 30 percent 
white and 19 percent coloured.  
As the designation suggests, the African Independent Churches are exclusive to 
blacks. The Charismatic churches and the religious movements, which are newer to 
South Africa than the mainline Christian churches, have a following throughout South 
African society. However, it is the Anglican Church which has the most diverse 
membership in terms of race, home language and geographical location.  
Noteworthy is that religious affiliation cuts across South Africa’s language divides.  
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Dominant home languages spoken by religious followers: 
Mainline Christian churches Xhosa (36%)
1
, Zulu (15), Western Sotho 
(14%) 
Dutch Reformed churches Afrikaans (54%), Western Sotho (19%) 
Anglican Church Xhosa (25%), English (24%), Zulu (15%) 
Roman Catholic Zulu (53%), English (11%) 
Baptist Church - 
Charismatic churches Afrikaans (19%), Zulu (16%), Xhosa (16%) 
Religious movements Xhosa (28%), Zulu (23%) 
African Independent Churches 
(AIC) 
Zulu (31%), Xhosa (19%) 
Islam English (58%), Afrikaans (14%), Other
2
 (6%) 
Hinduism English (100%) 
None Zulu (25%), Northern Sotho (21%) 
1
  36% of members of the mainline Christian churches speak Xhosa as their home language. 
2  
Other languages include Indian languages. 
 
Given South Africa’s language mix, one would expect isiZulu and isiXhosa speakers to 
dominate in most religious denominations. Western Sotho and Setswana speakers are 
also well represented in the mainline Christian churches and the Dutch Reformed 
churches. The Anglican and Catholic churches have a large English-speaking fol-
lowing. The Dutch Reformed churches are home mainly to Afrikaans speakers. Islam 
has its following among Indians and coloureds who speak either English, Afrikaans or 
Indian languages. 
The provinces differ markedly in terms of their cultural markers including racial 
composition, dominant languages spoken within their borders, and religion. Ethnicity 
and language markers overlap. The former homelands were set aside for different 
tribes which shared a common language (see map below). Thus, the dominant 
languages spoken in all the provinces including a former homeland are African ones. 
The Dutch Reformed churches have the largest following in the western part of the 
country in the Cape and North West. African Independent Churches are popular in the 
Eastern Cape, KwaZuluNatal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo, all provinces with vast tribal 
areas.   
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Dominant racial, language, and religious denominations in the nine provinces: 
 
Province Race groups  Home languages Religions 
Western Cape Coloured 55%, 
black 26%, 
white 17% 
Afrikaans
1
 64% Charismatic 27%, 
Dutch Reformed 
25% 
Northern Cape Coloured 46%, 
black 43%, 
white 11% 
Afrikaans
1
 75% Charismatic 28%, 
Dutch Reformed 
28% 
Eastern Cape Black 84%, 
white 8%, 
coloured 7% 
Xhosa 80% Mainline Christian 
27%, Charismatic 
22%, AIC
3
 22% 
Free State Black 84%, 
white 14%  
Southern Sotho 64% Dutch Reformed 
30%, Mainline 
Christian 26%  
KwaZuluNatal Black 81%, white 
9%, Indian 8% 
Zulu 78%, English 17%,  Roman Catholic 
26%, AIC
3
 23% 
Mpumalanga Black 91%, 
white 7% 
Zulu 35%, Swazi 31%,  AIC
3
 39%, 
Charismatic 15% 
Limpopo
2 
Black 95% Northern Sotho 50%, 
Tsonga 24%, Venda 
19% 
AIC
3
 28, 
Charismatic 27%  
Gauteng Black 81%, 
white 14% 
All languages are 
spoken 
Charismatic 25%, 
AIC
3
 21% 
North West Black 92%, 
white 5% 
Western Sotho 83% Dutch Reformed 
27% 
1 
Includes bilingual Afrikaans- and English-speakers 
2
 Known as Northern Province at the time of the survey 
3 
African Independent Churches 
 
Blacks are the majority group in all provinces with exception of the Western and 
Northern Cape. The Cape was formerly a coloured labour preference area, which ex-
plains the high concentration of the coloured population in the Western and Northern 
Cape. The white population is mainly in the metropolitan areas of Cape Town in the 
Western Cape Province, in Port Elizabeth and East London in the Eastern Cape 
Province, in Durban in KwaZuluNatal Province, and in the vast urban agglomerations 
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around Johannesburg and Pretoria in Gauteng Province. The white population in the 
Free State Province is mostly rural. The highest concentration of blacks is in the pro-
vinces which include the former homelands: Limpopo, North West, Mpumalanga, 
Eastern Cape and KwaZuluNatal. Noteworthy is that the African Independent Churches 
have a strong presence in these same provinces as well as in Gauteng, the reception 
area for the socially mobile from all provinces.  
The majority of Indians live in and around the Durban metropolitan area in 
KwaZuluNatal. Between 1860 and 1911, Indians were brought from India as inden-
tured labourers to work on the sugar estates of Natal. On completion of their contracts, 
some stayed on and found work as fishermen or market gardeners. Other Indians, 
mainly Muslim, came independently to South Africa to engage in trade. Restrictions 
were placed on the entry of Indians into some provinces including the Free State.  
As far as religions are concerned, the Charismatic churches have a following 
countrywide. The Dutch Reformed churches are concentrated in the western 
provinces of the Western and Northern Cape, the North West, and the Free State. 
Roman Catholics have a strong presence in KwaZuluNatal Province. 
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Stratification and cultural difference 
 
How does South African reality match the ambitious goals of a new nation committed 
to offering equal opportunities for all? 
South Africa’s first democratic elections held in April 1994 were hailed as a miracle.  
The notion of a ‘rainbow nation’, adopted as South Africa’s guiding symbol at the 
birth of democracy, epitomised the ideal of unity in diversity and a nation at peace with 
itself living in harmony. However, there is a tacit understanding among South Africans 
in the new political era that harmony presupposes a more equitable distribution of 
material resources in society to underpin the fledgling democracy. As mentioned 
earlier, the racial marker is one of the key indicators of progress used by South 
Africans to measure how far they have come to achieve the ideal of an equal op-
portunity society. 
With the new constitution of 1996, considered to be among the most progressive in 
the world, the new South Africa has set itself the goal of achieving a non-racial society 
while enshrining the rights of minorities. This section examines how economic and 
cultural differences are interrelated some eight years into democracy.  
 
Age and equal opportunities 
 
Important to note at the outset is that there is a wide gap in the age distributions of the 
races as shown in the table below.   
 
 Black Coloured Indian White   Ø 
- 34 years 56 50 52 43 54 
35 – 49 years 24 27 22 21 24 
50+ years 20 24 26 36 22 
 
While the white population has passed the demographic transition with an age 
distribution comparable to those of Western developed countries, the black population 
is still a young one. Over half of the black subsample is under 35 years of age while 
over a third of the white subsample is over 50 years of age. As described earlier, the 
chances of securing a job and earning a higher income increase progressively with 
age. Equally important for a study of democracy is that older people worldwide tend to 
be more conservative than their younger counterparts. It is obvious that age dif-
ferences will be reflected in the outlook on life and expectations for the future. 
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Social transformation for equal opportunities 
 
Social transformation is the new buzzword in South Africa. Equal opportunities
7
 
legislation introduced since 1994 has introduced affirmative action measures to 
accelerate the pace of transformation. Paradoxically, as mentioned earlier, South 
Africa still uses race as its key marker of progress in achieving its aim of transforming 
into a non-racial society. Racial quotas are defined to match the demographic profile of 
the population. Blacks, and to a lesser extent coloureds and Indians, as well as 
women and the disabled are considered previously disadvantaged groups who de-
serve advancement on potential rather than proven achievement. Initially, the question 
whether promotion according to affirmative action or merit would better serve South 
African society was hotly debated. In time, affirmative action measures were accepted 
as self-evident.  
Currently, official statistics at the national, provincial and local level, as well as in 
government departments, educational institutions, and private sector organisations 
record the race of current and prospective employees. It is perfectly legitimate, in fact 
essential, to ask job applicants to state their race and gender for purposes of ad-
dressing past inequalities in society. In contrast, the new labour legislation rules out 
questions to prospective job applicants referring to age, marital status, health status 
and other personal circumstances which might affect performance on the job. Affir-
mative action policies seek to address the proportion of women in all positions in 
society. Tenders for state-funded projects usually include a clause stipulating the pro-
vision of jobs for quotas of women as well as youth and the physically disabled. In 
terms of employment equity quotas, the prize goes to organisations that employ black 
women.  
Transformation is not an exclusive public-sector goal. All organisations in society 
are morally obliged to integrate larger numbers of previously disadvantaged sectors of 
society into their ranks. In order to comply with the new guidelines, private sector 
organisations are also obliged to submit their plans which set out their transformation 
strategies. Thus, private schools offer scholarships for pupils from the townships. 
There is pressure on sports clubs to run outreach programmes to develop previously 
less popular sports such as cricket and rugby among township youth. There is also 
pressure to replace good players on the South African teams with less experienced 
black sportsmen and women to represent South Africa. However, winning on the 
sports field is more important to many South Africans than political correctness. 
Therefore transformation in sports, which was fostered to promote national unity in the 
first years of democracy, has become a contentious issue.  
                                                 
7
  The clause on equality in the constitution rules out discrimination on the grounds of race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
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In short, South Africans are acutely conscious of the colour profile of all the groups 
and organisations to which they belong. Social comparisons along demographic lines 
are a by-product of the application of racial makers to chart progress in achieving an 
equal society.  
 
Gender and equal opportunities 
 
How do South African women, one of the major beneficiaries of affirmative action 
policies, fare in the new era? Our sample survey results show that black women have 
multiple disadvantages in that they tend to occupy the lowest occupational ranks, earn 
the lowest wages and swell the ranks of the unemployed. A significantly larger 
proportion of women than men in South African society have had no formal education, 
some 68 percent versus 32 percent. This translates into poor job opportunities. The 
majority of women remain outside the labour force: They account for 60 percent of the 
unemployed and 61 percent of pensioners and retired persons. Men dominate in the 
top managerial and executive positions, in the transport and communication sector, in 
agriculture, and as artisans, and miners and labourers. Although South Africa prides 
itself in the relatively high number of women who serve as members of parliament and 
ministers or their deputies in government departments, women are outnumbered by 
men in high positions outside of government and politics. The survey results show that 
women are employed mainly in the lower-ranking positions in clerical, sales and 
services. However, South African women have started to make their mark as 
professionals where they slightly outnumber men with 52 percent.  
Twice as many women than men reside in the tribal areas (65% versus 35%) 
where people live mainly from subsistence farming, remittances from household 
members working away from home, and from government transfers which provide a 
safety net to the old and the poor. Women also outnumber men in the poorer 
provinces of the Eastern Cape (61%) and Limpopo (63%). Female-headed house-
holds tend to be among the poorest, in part because households tend to form around 
female state pensioners. Hostel dwellers and workers on commercial farms are 
predominantly men (71% and 63%, respectively). The commercial farms employ 
seasonal workers as well as farm workers who live with their families. Formerly, the 
single-sex hostels catered to male migrant workers in town and on the mines who left 
their families behind to look after their interests in the rural homelands. Since 1994, a 
large number of hostels have been upgraded and transformed into family housing 
units.  
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Spatial distribution of economic opportunities 
 
Since the 1980s, South Africa is fast becoming an urban society. Over half of blacks 
are now residing in the urban and metropolitan areas. Black migrant workers, who 
formerly returned to the rural homelands after a working life, remain in town. In an 
open society, people vote with their feet and gravitate to urban centres and metro-
politan areas in search of employment opportunities or at least better access to ser-
vices, conveniences and government safety nets. A new phenomenon in the nineties 
has been the mushrooming of vast housing developments in small towns and squatter 
settlements in metropolitan areas that feature electricity and telephone wires strung 
overhead. A higher proportion of blacks currently live in squatter settlements than in 
migrant worker hostels. The black share of all small town and city dwellers in the 
sample is 32 percent, while the black share of metropolitan dwellers is 47 percent. 
Nevertheless, some 46 percent of blacks are still rural-based either in tribal areas in 
the former homelands (29%) or in other rural areas (17%) which include commercial 
farming areas.  
Some eight years into democracy, urban residential areas still tend to be colour-
coded. The majority of blacks in urban areas are concentrated in the areas formerly 
designated for blacks. Nevertheless, the survey results suggest that some racial 
mingling is taking place in the former common area. While some 26 percent of blacks 
in the sample still reside in the former black townships, a further 3 percent now live in 
townships formerly designated as coloured and Indian residential areas. Black res-
pondents in the survey account for some 19 percent of residents in former coloured 
townships and some 23 percent of residents in former Indian townships. However, the 
movement is not reciprocal. There is little evidence that black townships are accom-
modating people from the other race groups. 
Opportunities to earn a livelihood differ markedly from one province to another. The 
provinces with the former homelands – as indicated by the survey category of 'tribal 
area' – have large pockets of unemployment and low-income households. The richer 
provinces, Gauteng and the Western Cape, which include South Africa's two major 
metropolitan areas, have the largest proportion of richer households in the sample. 
Similarly, personal incomes are highest in Gauteng and the Western Cape, where 
between 17 and 19 percent earn the highest monthly incomes, and lowest in the 
predominantly rural Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces, where between 44 and 46 
percent report no income. KwaZuluNatal Province straddles the education and income 
divides in that it includes both one of the largest metropolitan centres as well as the 
deep rural areas of the former KwaZulu homeland. KwaZuluNatal evidences high 
levels of unemployment and illiteracy, presumably in the vast former rural homeland, 
as well as the higher education levels and better employment opportunities afforded by 
the metropolitan port city of Durban.  
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Women outnumber men with a ratio of over 60 to 40 percent in the poorer pro-
vinces of the Eastern Cape and Limpopo, which include former homelands. The domi-
nance of women can be attributed to the outmigration of men in search of work from 
the tribal areas in these two provinces. The peripheral provinces of Limpopo and the 
North West have the highest rates of illiteracy as indicated by no education or less 
than 5 years of education.  
 
Closing the gap between rich and poor 
 
Closing the gap between rich and poor is seen as an important goal in the new South 
Africa. Efforts are underway to promote black empowerment in the economic sector. 
There is widespread consensus that a just society should strive towards alleviating 
poverty and creating a better life for all.  
The table below shows that black economic empowerment still has a long way to 
go. The distribution of personal incomes earned by the black and white sectors of the 
population still follows the hierarchical pattern so characteristic of all South Africa’s 
social indicators under apartheid. On average, whites command the highest monthly 
incomes, blacks the lowest, with others in between. Similarly, some eight years into 
democracy, virtually all indicators of living conditions and quality of life show that 
blacks are worst off, whites best off, with coloured and Indians falling somewhere in 
between.  
 
 Black Coloured    Indian     White  Ø 
R1-579 30.8 26.5 18.5 3.2 27.3 
R580-1659 17.5 13.8 14.8 5.0 15.8 
R1660+ 7.2 22.8 29.6 37.4 12.2 
 
Income differentials are partly due to educational differences. A third of blacks have no 
education or are barely literate (indicated by up to five years of formal education). Only 
17 percent of blacks have a Grade 12 or higher education compared to 72 percent of 
whites, 46 percent of Indians and 25 percent of coloureds. The legacy of Bantu 
education under apartheid which had neglected the education of the black population, 
meant that there were insufficient people of colour who had the necessary educational 
qualifications and experience to meet the demands of commerce and industry. In the 
first years of democracy, educational institutions lost many of their promising young 
black staff to key positions in government and the public service that paid more. Given 
the shortage of educated black candidates, South Africa has experienced a skills 
shortage in virtually every sector of the economy.  
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Equally worrying for the new democracy is jobless growth. Although the African 
National Congress government's macro-economic policy has created a stable eco-
nomy, it has failed to attract the foreign investment needed to create jobs for a growing 
workforce. It is estimated that half a million jobs have been lost since the birth of de-
mocracy (The Economist, February 24, 2001, p 11). The macro-economic policy, Gear 
(Growth, Employment and Reconstruction) is a bone of contention between the ruling 
African National Congress and its trade union alliance partners. The latter are more in 
favour of populist policies to achieve equal opportunities and see the Gear policy as 
the cause of job shedding. On the other hand, in the global era, the new labour 
legislation which aims to promote employment equity, is regarded in some quarters as 
a disincentive to attract foreign investment and to create jobs in small business.  
The lowest wage earners in the sample are to be found in the sectors where wages 
and working conditions are not regulated, in agriculture and domestic service. At the 
time of writing, minimum wages and basic conditions of employment were being 
introduced for domestic and farm workers. Workers in both of these sectors are also to 
be covered by unemployment insurance in the near future. Even these low-paying jobs 
are under threat. With rising costs of living many families can no longer afford live-in or 
full-time domestic help and share domestic services with other households. Increasing 
production costs, new legislation on the rights of tenants, and anticipation of minimum 
wage legislation in agriculture have prompted many commercial farmers to mechanise 
and reduce the size of their labour force. 
 
Education and equal opportunities 
 
Education appears to hold the key to economic success in South African society. In 
our sample, the limited jobs available go to the better educated. Occupational status is 
linked to educational achievement at both the individual and household level. At the 
household level, some 66 percent of respondents from households earning the lowest 
incomes have 7 years of education or less. In contrast, 52 percent of respondents from 
the more affluent households have at least 12 years of education. At the individual 
level, some 70 percent of the lowest income earners have 7 years of education or less, 
while 69 percent of the highest earners have at least 12 years of education. Rural 
dwellers are disadvantaged when it comes to access to education. Above-average 
proportions of persons living in the former homelands (16%), and in other rural areas 
(19%) have had no formal education. It is precisely these two categories that report the 
lowest household incomes: 37 percent of former homeland residents and just over half 
of residents of other rural areas report household incomes of less than R579 per 
month.  
The racial distribution across occupational rank and earnings matches educational 
levels. Although blacks appear to have made significant inroads into the ranks of 
professionals, managers, and clerical and sales workers, the vast majority are still 
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employed in low-skill positions or have joined the ranks of the unemployed. The legacy 
of Bantu education, which prepared black school leavers only for the most menial of 
jobs, mainly as domestic and agricultural workers, remains to be undone.  
 
 Black Coloured Indian White    Ø 
High & medium ranking 
professionals & managers  
5 7 9 20 7 
Semi-, unskilled workers 29 25 9 7 26 
Unemployed 30 22 13 4 26 
 
 
Equal opportunities and language 
 
The new South Africa recognises eleven official languages with English as the com-
mon one.  
Whereas, previously, official documents were published in Afrikaans and English, 
they are now in English. By printing their notices, business cards, letterheads and 
pamphlets in an African language, private-sector organisations communicate their 
support of the new political dispensation and country’s new language policy. In 2003, 
the government's new language policy mandates government offices to print 
communications in at least three of the languages used in their area of jurisdiction to 
promote cultural diversity.  
On the hills overlooking the Western Cape town of Paarl is the monument erected 
to celebrate the Afrikaans language. Afrikaans emerged from a dialect brought to the 
country by the Dutch in the 17
th
 century. The definite losers in the new language policy 
are Afrikaans speakers whose mother tongue served as the official language for forty 
years under the previous government. A command of Afrikaans was formerly a 
requisite when applying for a public sector job. Afrikaans was the dominant language 
of bureaucracy and the language’s ability to assimilate loan words also allowed it to 
serve as the language of technology and higher learning. In the new era, the formerly 
Afrikaans-medium universities are expected to teach in English to accommodate the 
rapidly growing intake of black students. Afrikaans now shares television and radio 
time with the other nine minority languages. 
The Afrikaans language still retains some of its connotation as the language of 
oppression under apartheid rule. The Soweto uprising of 1976 was in protest that 
black students were taught in Afrikaans. At the time of writing, education policy makers 
are reconsidering their stance on Afrikaans as the dominant medium of instruction in 
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some of the country's leading universities. Education policy makers are seriously 
considering promoting select African languages as medium of instruction alongside 
English in higher education. This would give black students the advantage of being 
taught in their home language right up to the tertiary level. The development of 
Afrikaans in the former era might be used as a model when seeking to elevate an 
African language as medium of instruction in higher education.  
The language issue, with its symbolism, remains a divisive issue in the new era. 
Afrikaans is a source of pride and identity for many white South Africans. The main 
concern of white Afrikaans-speakers is that their cultural heritage will be lost or diluted 
under the new dispensation. However, it is now the coloured community that repre-
sents the largest group of Afrikaans speakers. In the negotiations leading to South 
Africa's peaceful settlement, coloured leaders sought to allay white fears that the 
Afrikaans language might become extinct if there were a change of government. They 
vouched to safeguard the country's language heritage in the transition.  
 
Religion and equal opportunities  
 
The established Christian churches have always played an important role in South 
African politics. Under apartheid many of them opposed the ruling party of the day. In 
the 1980s breakaway groups from the Dutch Reformed churches took a strong stand 
against apartheid and paved the way for negotiations between the ruling National 
Party and the African National Congress in exile. Former Anglican Archbishop Des-
mond Tutu was a strong advocate of economic sanctions which forced the National 
Party to change its political course in the late 1980s. In the democratic era, he was to 
become the chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee to hear human rights 
violations.  
In the 1990s and the millennium, the archbishops of the Catholic and Anglican 
churches continue to provide strong leadership. In the political arena, they compete as 
outspoken critics and watchdogs of the new government and have created an 
ecumenical forum to review the major issues in society including poverty and the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Anglican Archbishop Tutu’s successor, Njongonkulu Ndungane, 
has become the champion of the poor and has lobbied for debt relief to African 
countries to raise the standard of living for the poor. Although the Zion Christian 
Church – included in the African Independent Church category in the survey – has 
chosen to stay out of politics, it did allow leaders from across the political spectrum to 
address its members in the run-up to the first national elections in 1994. As mentioned 
earlier, members of the African Independent Churches rank lowest on many socio-
economic markers. Given their position in society, members of the African Indepen-
dent Churches have the most to gain from equal opportunities to enhance their life 
chances in the democratic era.  
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Psychosocial Attitudes 
 
 
Most social surveys assume that social factors such as gender, age, residence, 
occupation, education and income, mother tongue and ethnic and religious affiliation 
will influence people's thinking in matters of society and politics. However, subjective 
feelings will also shape people's views of society and politics. In this chapter, we re-
view South Africans' trust in other people, fear or confidence, openness or resistance 
to change and belief in the ability to deal with others. These are all factors that may 
influence political attitudes. All items have been applied in previous cross-cultural 
studies. 
 
People trust and feel close to some people and not to others. For each of the 
following types of people, tell us whether you feel close to and trust them. 
 
In order of frequency, the respondents expressed their trust in: 
 
Family 90 
People of my religion 65 
Friends 62 
Neighbours 56 
People of my ethnic group 51 
People with the same working and living conditions 46 
People from my village, town, home district 43 
People from my province 32 
All South African citizens 28 
Nobody 10 
  
Trust is multi-layered. It operates in concentric spheres. Trust is greatest in the 
intimate family circle and least pronounced at the more distant provincial and national 
level. The ordering of the layers between these poles is worth noting. Trust in fellow 
religionists falls somewhere between family and friends. Trust in members of one's 
own ethnic group features between neighbours and people sharing the same living 
and working conditions. One in ten respondents state they trust nobody.  
There are a number of variations in the general pattern of trust relationships.  
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Indians tend to be more trusting than the other ethnic groups identified in the 
survey. It is only when it comes to the outermost layer of trust in fellow South Africans 
that Indian and black South Africans score the same 30 to 31 percent.  
It is apparent that in the urban areas the hostel situation breeds caution in social 
interactions. Hostel dwellers tend to be less trusting than other urban dwellers. Hostel 
dwellers are more likely than others to say they distrust people in closest proximity 
including friends, neighbours, co-religionists, people who share the same ethnic 
origins and the same living conditions, as well as all South Africans.  
Levels of trust also tend to vary according to cultural markers such as home 
language and religion. The small subgroups of Ndebele and Venda speakers tend to 
express greater trust in other people, an exception being trust in friends. It seems that 
bilinguals who consider both English and Afrikaans to be their home languages, are 
torn in their loyalties. They express below-average levels of trust in all South Africans 
as well as in people who share similar living conditions, in fellow members of their 
ethnic and religious groups, and in fellow citizens of their province. The small groups of 
Hindus and Muslims in the survey expressed high levels of trust in most instances.  
Almost everyone trusts family. The lowest level of trust in family, between 82 and 
85 percent, is found among Western Sotho speakers who are concentrated in the 
North West province.  
Trust in co-religionists is most pronounced among Hindus, to a slightly lesser 
degree among Muslims, and among Indians generally. Between 80 and 90 percent in 
these categories say they trust people of their own religion. Between 72 and 76 
percent of Anglicans, members of the Dutch Reformed and Baptist churches and 
religious movements trust their co-religionists. As might be expected, the level of trust 
is lowest among persons stating no religious affiliation. Possibly in reflection of 
religious participation, more women than men and more respondents over fifty years of 
age place their trust in co-religionists.  
Friendship is by definition based on trust. The majority of South Africans, some 62 
percent, state they trust their friends. Trust in friends appears to be above average, 
mainly over 70 percent, in cities and the metropolitan areas, and among professionals, 
higher income earners and the better educated. Least trusting of their friends, between 
39 and 54 percent, are Swazis, residents of Mpumalanga Province and members of 
religious movements and African Independent Churches. 
The pattern is inverted for trust in neighbours. Lower education and personal in-
come are systematically related to higher levels of trust in neighbours. It is likely that 
low-income groups are more dependent on neighbours when in need in terms of 
norms of mutual solidarity. The lowest occupational levels and lowest income earners 
place greater trust in their neighbours than do professionals and high-ranking occu-
pations and the higher earners. However, trust in neighbours is lowest among hostel 
dwellers possibly due to the fact that they share confined living space with neighbours. 
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Hindus and Muslims and to a lesser degree respondents from KwaZuluNatal and the 
Northern Cape express above-average levels of trust in their neighbours. 
Ethnicity is an important cultural marker in South Africa. Approximately half of all 
respondents state they trust people of their own ethnic group. Hostel and township 
dwellers as well as residents of metropolitan areas tend to be less trusting than others. 
While 69 percent of isiNdebele and Tshivenda speakers trust members of their ethnic 
group, only 37 percent of bilingual Afrikaans and English speakers do so. Levels of 
trust in one's own ethnic group are lowest among Roman Catholics and members of 
African Independent Churches and highest among Hindus and Muslims.  
Feelings of solidarity with people sharing the same working and living conditions is 
greatest in the farming and service sectors which are among the largest employers. 
Rural dwellers tend to express significantly higher levels of trust in fellow workers than 
people living in the metropolitan areas. Residents of former Indian suburbs feel closer 
to colleagues than residents of former black suburbs. The Eastern Cape, the Northern 
Cape and KwaZuluNatal, all provinces with large rural populations, are associated with 
trust in colleagues.  
It is apparent that trust in people from the same village or hometown is associated 
with restricted geographical mobility. Older and rural South Africans still have roots in 
their home districts of origin. Trust in people from one's own village, town or home 
district increases systematically with age. Residents of tribal and other rural areas 
express much higher levels of trust than metropolitan and urban dwellers. The Eastern 
and Northern Cape provinces, which have large rural populations, are associated with 
higher levels of trust in people of one's own village. The lowest levels of trust are found 
among Southern Sotho, Siswati and Afrikaans and English speakers. It is possible that 
some whites and English speakers trace their origins to places beyond South Africa 
which might account for the low levels of trust, between 34 and 39 percent, among 
these two survey categories. 
White and coloured respondents, and residents of metropolitan and the former 
coloured areas report significantly below-average levels of trust in people from their 
own province. Retired persons and people in managerial positions indicate high trust 
while professionals, artisans and miners are among the occupations indicating low 
trust. As is the case with the trust relationships discussed so far, Tshivenda and 
isiNdebele speakers indicate the highest levels of trust. People of the Western Cape 
express lowest trust while people from the Northern Cape, Limpopo and Gauteng feel 
closest to the people of their province.  
Trust in fellow South Africans might be considered a matter of patriotism in the 
democratic era. It may be telling that trust in all South Africans is the only dimension 
on which black South Africans score higher than Indians who generally express the 
highest levels of trust. Approximately 30 to 31 percent of Indian and black South 
Africans state they feel close to their compatriots. The highest levels of trust are found 
in the tribal and rural areas, the lowest levels in towns, hostels and the metropolitan 
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areas. There are wide discrepancies between the provinces ranging from 13 percent in 
the Western Cape to 34 to 38 percent in the Northern Cape and Limpopo. Muslims, 
members of religious movements, the Dutch Reformed churches and Anglicans score 
between 19 and 23 percent trust in all South Africans, while members of mainline 
Christian churches score 34 percent and Hindus 42 percent, respectively. 
Language may be among the most important cultural markers of feelings of 
solidarity with fellow South Africans. Speakers of languages of European origin exhibit 
the lowest levels of trust while speakers of the minority African languages, isiNdebele 
and Tsivenda, exhibit the highest levels of trust. Within the three most dominant 
African language groups, Western Sotho speakers feel closer to fellow South Africans 
than Xhosa or Zulu speakers.  
The degree of trust by home language is as follows: 
   Trust in all people of South Africa (average: 28 percent) 
Home language % 
Afrikaans and English 14 
Afrikaans 16 
Other languages 18 
English 22 
Zulu 26 
Xhosa 30 
Northern Sotho  31 
Tsonga 31 
Swazi 31 
Southern Sotho  34 
Western Sotho  37 
Venda 60 
Ndebele 64 
An index was created to measure levels of trust ranging from trust in family to trust in 
fellow South Africans. A reliable index was produced that included all nine trust 
relationships. Scores ranged from 0, in the case of trust in no one, up to 9, in the case 
of trust in all nine reference groups under study. Scores are distributed as follows:  
  
Trust Index Scores  
None (0-1) 17 
Low  (2-3) 23 
Medium (4-5) 19 
Trusting (6-7) 17 
High trust (8-9) 23 
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Overall levels of trust tend to be highest among Indians and older and retired persons. 
Generally it appears to be easier for members of close-knit minority groups and 
smaller-scale rural communities to be trusting. High trust scores are characteristic of 
the agricultural sector, the tribal and commercial rural areas, and of Limpopo, a 
predominantly rural province. The minority language groups of the Ndebele and Venda 
score above average on the index. By religion, it is the minority religions of Islam and 
Hinduism that are the most trusting. Muslims are the highest scorers overall. Good 
scores on trust are achieved by virtually all of the more established Christian 
denominations including the mainline Christian protestant churches, the Dutch Re-
formed churches, Roman Catholics and Baptists.  
Low trust scores appear to be concentrated among groups that are more exposed 
to potentially harmful social contacts through their work or living circumstances. 
Groups that are more guarded in their relations with others include hostel dwellers, 
transport workers and miners. Low trust is also observed among residents of the Free 
State, Swazis and members of the African Independent Churches and religious 
movements.  
 
I feel uncertain and fearful about my future. 
 
Just under two thirds (62%) agree with this statement, black and Indian respondents 
more often than coloured and white respondents. Fear and uncertainty decreases with 
higher levels of education and household and personal incomes. Respondents in the 
lower skills, lower-paid occupations which require few educational qualifications, 
particularly in the agricultural and service sectors, are among the most cautious and 
fearful. No doubt fears are related to unemployment and poverty. Fear is highest in the 
poor province of the Eastern Cape and lowest in the more affluent Western Cape. 
Afrikaans and English speakers, who tend to be better-educated and command higher 
incomes than average, are less likely to endorse feelings of uncertainty and fear-
fulness than speakers of African languages. Over 70 percent of members of the 
African Independent Churches say they feel fearful about their future. It seems that 
feelings of security inspired by religious beliefs and fellowship are overshadowed by 
economic insecurities in this category. With fifty percent endorsing the statement, 
Baptists and Roman Catholics, who come from a range of social backgrounds, are 
least fearful about the future. 
 
One should be very cautious with people. You cannot trust the people who live 
and work around you.  
 
Slightly over two thirds (68%) agree with the statement. Semi- and unskilled workers 
tend to be more cautious in their interpersonal relations, in particular transport workers. 
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People from the Northern Cape are among the most cautious while Tshivenda and 
isiZulu speakers and residents of KwaZuluNatal are less circumspect in their dealings 
with other people.  
The following two statements are often used as indicators of social conservatism: 
 
One should be sure that something really works before taking chances. 
If you try to change things you usually make them worse. 
 
While three-quarters agree with the first statement, which expresses caution with the 
unknown, only just over a third are fundamentally sceptical about change.  
Higher education, income and occupational status are strongly associated with 
more positive attitudes to change. Fundamental scepticism eases progressively with 
level of education and personal and household income. Managers, administrators, and 
clerical workers are less averse to taking risks than transport workers, farmers, and 
miners. Fear of change is greatest in South Africa's tribal and rural areas and among 
unskilled and agricultural workers.  
Given their educational and income advantages, Indian and white South Africans 
tend to be less averse to change than their black and coloured compatriots. However, 
conservative pockets of South African society are found in the farming regions, in the 
mainly agricultural Free State Province, among Afrikaans speakers and members of 
the Dutch Reformed and Charismatic churches.  
Among provinces, KwaZuluNatal - which has a high concentration of Indians and 
whites, English speakers and Roman Catholics - emerges as the least conservative.  
 
There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my 
country. 
 
Just over six in ten (61%) responded in the affirmative, indicating that they did not feel 
they could assist in improving the well-being of compatriots. Feelings of disem-
powerment are clearly related to lower education and socio-economic status. People 
who lack the resources to manage their own lives obviously feel ill equipped to build 
their society. Agency increases progressively with income and personal and house-
hold income. Housewives and farm workers feel least capable of effecting improve-
ments while professionals and managers feel most capable. Urban residents in towns 
and metropolitan areas are better placed or feel more confident to make improvements 
than rural dwellers.  
Given the socio-economic disparities in South African society, the racial marker is a 
good indicator of feelings of empowerment. Indians feel most capable of effecting 
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change with 43 percent endorsing the statement, followed by whites (50%), and at a 
distance, by blacks (63%) and lastly coloureds (67%). Analogously, residents of the 
former Indian suburbs feel most empowered while residents of the former coloured 
residential suburbs least empowered. Other cultural markers follow suit. Among the 
provinces, KwaZuluNatal, with the largest concentration of Indians and English 
speakers, scores highest on empowerment, North West province lowest. By language, 
English and Xitsonga speakers score highest on agency; isiNdebele and Western 
Sotho speakers lowest. Membership of the Dutch Reformed Church, which has a 
strong coloured following, is associated with above-average sense of disempower-
ment. At the other pole, Hindus, Muslims, Baptists and Roman Catholics are among 
those who feel the strongest sense of agency. It is possible that the latter are in-
fluenced by the example of strong church leadership.  
While the majority of South Africans feel they do not have the resources to uplift 
their society, they believe solidarity will nevertheless make a difference.  
 
Even ordinary people can make progress if they help each other. 
 
Nine in ten endorse the statement. This time round, coloured people score slightly 
above the average along with Indians and Whites – between 97 and 98 percent. The 
idea of solidarity appeals more to the better off in society. People living in towns, the 
metropolitan areas and in the richer provinces of the Western Cape and Gauteng 
score above average. Residents of black townships, squatter and tribal areas are less 
likely to support the notion of solidarity although it is commonly regarded as the 
backbone of African society. Support for the idea that solidarity will accelerate 
progress increases systematically with personal and household income. However, a 
similarly high proportion of households who claim no income and ones in the highest 
income bracket endorse solidarity as a catalyst for social development. Almost all 
English speakers are supportive of solidarity. In line with their strong feelings of 
interpersonal trust, the minority groups of Venda and Ndebele are among the best 
supporters of social solidarity.   
To sum up, South Africans are still cautious about placing their trust in fellow South 
Africans some eight years after a negotiated settlement. Ethnic and religious ties 
appear to be closer. The majority in society are cautious about grasping new op-
portunities for development. Lack of a sense of efficacy prevails although almost all 
South Africans pay lip service to the notion of group solidarity to achieve progress. All 
these attitudes are personal. Nevertheless, they appear to be influenced by the 
economic power that respondents wield in South African society which still reflects the 
divides of the former era. Thus, the gulf between rich and poor, and black and white, is 
as remarkable in psychological attitudes as it is in the layers of social class. People at 
the centre who belong to the economically powerful groups are generally more 
trusting, open to new ideas, and more confident in their personal capabilities. The 
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black population lags behind in its levels of trust, and self-confidence. Interestingly, 
Indians, a small but economically powerful group, express the highest levels of trust 
and agency, yet are fearful of the future. As we shall see later, their concern about the 
future is a recurrent theme in their survey responses.   
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Perceptions of the Economy and Society 
 
 
South Africa achieved a political miracle with the April 1994 elections when all South 
Africans, black and white, went to the polls to cast their vote for the first democratically 
elected government. Many of the new voters hoped that the democratic era would 
bring greater prosperity. Indeed the election promises were for a 'better life for all'. 
How do South Africans see their economic opportunities some eight years into 
democracy?  
Economic advisors point out that foreign investment is attracted to a country where 
people are themselves prepared to invest in their own future. An item in the survey 
probed willingness to save rather than spend. 
 
Imagine that you are lucky and win a lot of money in the lottery. On which one of 
the following would you spend more than others? 
 
 Starting a business 29 
 Investing in a bank with good profit 26 
 Enjoying to spend the money on myself or my family 24 
 Improving my house and my furniture 19 
 Other 2 
 
All options presented to the respondents appear to be attractive. Approximately equal 
proportions of respondents would become entrepreneurs or invest their money for the 
future. Slightly lower proportions, less than one-fourth, would spend the money on 
themselves or on home improvements.  
Economic choices differ according to social background. However, differences in 
choices are subtle rather than clear-cut. 
The business option is more attractive to blacks, Zulus in particular, to men rather 
than women, and to the 18 to 24 year age cohort. It is mainly better-educated profess-
sional people and sales and clerical workers earning above-average salaries who 
state they might become entrepreneurs if they had a windfall. Zulus and residents from 
KwaZuluNatal are likely to be attracted to the business option. This result is somewhat 
surprising in that Zulus are better known as descendents of warriors and their 
commercial prowess in KwaZuluNatal is overshadowed by that of Indians who are in 
part descendents of traders. However, there are also signs that entrepreneurship 
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might be seen as a way out of poverty: Unemployed persons and respondents from 
households with no income and those based in tribal areas also see themselves as 
entrepreneurs.  
Potential investors are found mainly among the Indians and whites in the survey. 
The persons who would bank their windfall are for the most part urban-based in cities 
and metropolitan areas, working in higher-ranking managerial positions or as artisans. 
The majority are English speakers or bilingual in English or Afrikaans. Gauteng 
Province, at the centre of South Africa's economy, would supply the largest proportion 
of investors.  
The highest proportion of consumers is to be found among black and coloured 
respondents. While coloured respondents focus on spending on themselves and 
family, the black consumers wish to invest in improving their homes. Age appears to 
play a difference in consumption patterns: younger individuals would prefer to spend 
the money on themselves and family while older persons would rather improve their 
homes. It is mainly lower income households and individuals, including agricultural 
and service workers, that would consume a windfall. Xhosas and people from the 
Eastern Cape are well represented among the potential home improvers. Sotho 
speakers generally and persons from the peripheral northern provinces, are over-
represented among potential consumers. The consumption option may be an ex-
pression of the need to catch up rather than personal indulgence. No doubt many of 
the oppressed under the former political dispensation wish to make good their backlog 
in consumption. Furthermore, the former government did not promote an ethos of 
entrepreneurship among the politically marginalised.  
A further dimension of the economic ethos is the perception of the ingredients of 
success in life.  
In your opinion, which one of the following is the most important for achieving 
success in life? 
Responses in approximate order of frequency are as follows: 
Working hard for myself 39 
Education 26 
Working with others and standing 
together as a group 
10 
Experience 8 
What your parents taught you 4 
Religious beliefs 3 
Connections 3 
Other 7 
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South Africans believe that hard work and education will open up the doors to 
success. To a lesser extent, group efforts are also perceived as a means of getting 
ahead.  
The social profile of persons who believe in hard work as the principal ingredient in 
success is dominated by whites and coloureds, men, individuals earning higher 
personal incomes and the higher-ranking occupations including managers, profess-
sionals, artisans, and skilled manual workers. Afrikaans, English and isiZulu speakers 
believe in hard work as do members of the Dutch Reformed churches and Baptists. 
Among the provinces, the highest proportion of votes comes from Limpopo, Gauteng 
and KwaZuluNatal.  
Education is seen as the means of social mobility mainly among younger South 
Africans and particularly among students and learners. The peripheral city dwellers 
including shack and hostel dwellers, and residents of former coloured and black 
townships are more likely than others to place their bets on education. The highest 
proportion of votes for education comes from coloured respondents and from the 
Western Cape Province which has a large coloured population. Muslims, Anglicans, 
Roman Catholics and the mainline Christian churches place their faith in education to 
achieve in life.  
Communal efforts to guarantee success are supported by whites and metropolitan 
dwellers and by managers and clerical workers as well as farm workers. Sotho 
speakers (Southern and Western) and Tshivenda speakers advocate solidarity. 
Among religious groups, the highest proportion of votes come from members of main-
line Christian churches. 
The experience option has a weak social profile which features transport workers 
and miners as well as students and learners.  
As might be expected, respect for parental teachings is more widespread in the 
more conservative tribal areas. Concerning home language and religious markers, 
isiXhosa and isiNdebele speakers, and members of the Charismatic churches and 
Hindus vote for parental teachings. 
Religious beliefs and connections as a means to move up the social ladder tend to 
be endorsed by Indians and women. Connections are particularly important to the 
unemployed. Above-average proportions of Muslims, Dutch Reformed and Hindus 
endorse religious beliefs as the key to success.  
 
Job aspirations represent a strong indicator of the economic ethos. Under the 
former political dispensation, job options were severely curtailed for the majority of the 
population. In the new era, government support for individual entrepreneurship has 
increased, and employment equity legislation and black empowerment strategies seek 
to address past disadvantages for black entrepreneurs.  
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The following item was put to respondents to probe their willingness to take 
financial risks.  
What kind of job would you prefer?  
A job in a factory or in an office with a good salary you can rely on  
Or 
Your own business where you can win a lot or lose a lot? 
 
The majority of black and coloured respondents opted for the financial security of a 
wage job, Indian and white respondents for their own business.  
 
 Race Group 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
 
Ø 
Job Preference       
Salaried job 57 70 49 46 57 
Own business 43 30 51 54 43 
  
Willingness to take financial risks increases progressively with age. While only 38 
percent of 18-24 year olds would risk starting their own business, up to 57 percent in 
the over-fifty age cohort would accept the challenge. The unemployed, persons with 
no income of their own, and students would predominantly opt for securer wage work. 
The same applies to people currently working in high-risk, stressful jobs among the 
lower-income earners, such as miners and transport workers.  
The association with education is inverted up to the tertiary level. With each year of 
education up to the level of matriculation in Grade 12, the aspiration to secure salaried 
employment increases. Approximately 48 percent of respondents with no education up 
to 63 percent with Grade 12 education would opt for a salaried job. Beyond Grade 12, 
people feel more confident about financial risk-taking; an above-average 48 percent 
would risk starting their own business.  
The entrepreneurial spirit is more pronounced among Western Sotho speakers and 
members of the Dutch Reformed churches who are concentrated in the North West 
province. Coloured people of the Western Cape are least inclined to opt for entre-
preneurship. Roman Catholics and persons with no religion tend to favour salaried 
jobs while Baptists and members of religious movements are more inclined to opt for 
starting their own business.  
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If I could, I would change to another kind of job. 
 
Only half of the sample responded to the statement. Given the fact that approximately 
one quarter of the sample are unemployed and 60 percent are economically inactive, it 
is hardly surprising that aspirations to change jobs are not an issue for so many South 
Africans. 
Among those who responded to the statement, a majority of 63 percent agreed. 
The proportion wishing to switch jobs reflects the racial hierarchy of economic power. 
Blacks are least contented with their present jobs; whites most contented with others 
somewhere in between.  
Men and younger people are more anxious to change jobs, as are the economically 
weak. The association with age is linear: some 67 percent among 18 to 24 year olds 
wish to change jobs but only 52 percent in the fifty-plus age cohort. Hostel dwellers, 
squatters and rural dwellers are discontented with their present occupations. Similarly, 
transport workers, miners, and service workers would change jobs if they could. 
Job satisfaction increases systematically with household and personal income. 
Almost three-quarters of persons with a Grade 1 to 5 education and persons earning 
less than R579 a month would like to change their jobs. Only about one in two at the 
upper end of the education and income scale wish to do so. 
Dissatisfaction with one's job is highest in the northern peripheral provinces of 
Mpumalanga and the North West, lowest in the Free State, Northern Cape and the 
Western Cape where Afrikaans speakers dominate. Home language and religious 
markers overlap. The highest job satisfaction is found among Afrikaans and English 
speakers, members of the Dutch Reformed churches, Muslims, and Hindus. Above-
average dissatisfaction with one's job is found among members of the African Inde-
pendent Churches. 
In a second item on perceptions of economic opportunities, respondents were 
asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement. 
 
Of course people always like to earn more, but I consider my income to be 
reasonable.  
 
Response patterns suggest that perceptions of economic opportunities are linked to 
both job and income aspirations. Just on a third did not respond to the item, pre-
sumably because they are not earning at the moment. Approximately half of those who 
responded to the statement, 49 percent, indicated that they are earning a reasonable 
income.  
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People in higher-ranking positions in the economy are more satisfied with their 
income situation than others. Marginal urban people living in hostels and shacks feel 
they are entitled to higher earnings as are those working in unskilled jobs. Satisfaction 
with income is positively associated with both household and personal income. Less 
than four in ten among the lowest earners felt they were earning a reasonable income. 
Residents of the richest provinces, Gauteng and the Western Cape, as well as the 
Free State, are most satisfied with their incomes while residents of the remoter and 
poorer provinces of the North West and Limpopo are most dissatisfied. English and 
Southern Sotho speakers are among the satisfied earners; isiZulu, Western Sotho, 
and the minority isiNdebele speakers among the most dissatisfied. The religious 
categories of Muslims, Anglicans, Dutch Reformed and mainline Christian churches 
are associated with higher satisfaction with earnings, African Independent Churches 
with the highest dissatisfaction.  
Eight years into democracy the disparities in perceived economic opportunities are 
still by and large racially defined. In the table below, black respondents are most 
dissatisfied with their jobs and incomes, whites most satisfied, with others somewhere 
in between.  
 
 Black Coloured Indian White Ø 
Would like to change jobs
1 
68 53 50 39 63 
Not earning reasonable 
income
2
 
54 57 47 30 51 
    1
 n1107, 
2
 n1454 
 
What are the prospects of improving one's economic situation? A third item inquired 
into perceptions of opportunities for personal advancement. 
 
Whatever my personal efforts, I will not get the education and jobs I am entitled to. 
 
The majority, some 55 percent, express pessimistic views. The racial marker is 
significant here. However, this time round the hierarchy is flatter and only whites are 
confident of achieving their place in the economy to any significant degree. Only 
respondents in the highest household and personal income categories are positive 
about their economic opportunities. 
The response pattern suggests that young people's optimism fades progressively 
as they grow older and accept reality in society. Some 60 percent in the age cohort 25-
34 years are concerned that their efforts to advance economically will be thwarted. 
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However, confidence does increase systematically with level of education. Students, 
along with professionals, managers and to a lesser extent, clerical workers, are more 
inclined to think they will achieve the economic position they deserve. It is mainly the 
older and rural generation that does not see any economic opportunities on the horizon. 
Agricultural and transport workers and miners are among the most disillusioned.  
By home language, English speakers are most confident of achieving their eco-
nomic rights followed by isiXhosa and Afrikaans speakers. By province, KwaZulu 
Natal, the Eastern and Western Cape are above average in confidence. By religion, 
over half of Baptists, Roman Catholics and members of mainline Christian churches 
and the religious movements believe that their economic potential will be fulfilled.  
 
Younger men and women of a family like mine have a reasonably good chance 
of reaching their goals in life. 
 
South Africans are more optimistic about the next generation achieving their economic 
ambitions than for themselves. Two thirds of total respondents agree with the above 
statement.  
Indians are most optimistic about the future for their children followed by whites. 
The latter result contradicts the popular perception that many white parents see no 
future for their children in South Africa. The percentage of optimists among coloureds 
is about average, with blacks slightly less positive at 64 percent. 
Positive outlook on the future for one's children increases progressively with edu-
cation and personal income but is systematically tempered with increasing age. Rural 
dwellers and hostel dwellers, who are for the most part migrant workers from rural 
areas, are least positive about future life chances. Interestingly, squatters are as opti-
mistic as other urban dwellers about economic chances for themselves and their 
children. Higher-ranking occupations, including managers, professionals and clerical 
workers, are significantly more positive than semi- and unskilled workers.  
The outlook on the future for the next generation is above-average among English 
and isiXhosa speakers; by province in the Western and Eastern Cape and Mpuma-
langa, and by religion among Muslims, Hindus, Anglicans and mainline Christian 
churches.  
While respondents see a brighter future for their children generally, this does not 
necessarily translate into confidence that the next generation will enjoy a higher 
standard of living.  
 
I am afraid that our children might not enjoy as high a standard of living as I have. 
Some 57 percent agree. Indians who were among the most confident that their 
children would reach their goals in life, are most concerned about future prosperity with 
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72 percent agreement. Black respondents are most optimistic about future standards 
of living with below-average agreement of 55 percent. Whites and coloured people fall 
in between with 63 percent agreement. Above-average optimism regarding future 
levels of living for the next generation are expressed by hostel dwellers, isiXhosa 
speakers and Roman Catholics.  
The table gives an overview of optimism about current and future life chances 
expressed by the different racial groups in response to the three items reviewed 
above.  
 Race Group 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
 
Ø 
Optimist ic  about  l i fe chances       
For self (will get education  
and job entitled to) 
42 46 48 67 45 
For children  
(will reach goals in life) 
64 68 93 80 67 
Optimistic about children's 
standard of living 
45 38 28 37 43 
Noteworthy in the above table is that blacks are least optimistic of all that they and 
their children will develop their potential in life. Nevertheless they are more confident 
than others that the next generation will enjoy a better standard of living.  
When evaluating their life circumstances, whom do South Africans project as their 
reference for comparison?  
When you think about what you have achieved in life, with whom do you 
compare yourself most often? 
In order of frequency, the answers are the following: 
Nobody 45 
People like myself ten years ago 14 
My neighbours 12 
My school mates 11 
People of other population groups in my country 7 
People in other African countries 6 
Rich people 3 
Westerners 2 
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In a country which sought to enforce narrow social comparisons within ethnic groups 
the results are somewhat unexpected. How should one interpret the finding that the 
single largest group of South Africans do not compare their situation with anyone? Is it 
a sign of maturity and self-confidence in a newfound identity that causes South 
Africans to reject social comparisons? Or do South Africans wish to isolate themselves 
from the rest of the world as a special case. According to this type of interpretation, 
comparison with 'nobody' might also be equated with comparison with the con-
temporary self or a sense of superiority.  
The opposite interpretation also lies close at hand. If South Africans consider 
themselves to be underachievers, they might shy away from making self-assessments 
relative to others to protect their ego-integrity.  
Whichever interpretation holds, the interesting finding is that respondents who do 
make reference comparisons cite 'neutral' standards relating to the earlier self and 
categories close to the self such as neighbours and schoolmates. Only a minority 
choose reference comparisons with people better off than themselves, such as rich 
people or Westerners
8
 with access to higher material benefits that might incite feelings 
of resentment and relative deprivation. This in itself is remarkable in a society that is 
supposedly obsessed with racial reference comparisons which have been engrained 
over decades. 
The social profiles of the various choices of reference standards provide some 
clues to the right interpretation of the above survey results.  
The reference to 'nobody' is somewhat more common among city dwellers, in 
particular Indians, Muslims and Hindus. The tendency to avoid making social com-
parisons increases systematically with age and personal income which supports the 
maturity hypothesis. By province, the highest proportion of references to 'nobody' is in 
Limpopo. Although moving from a very low base, rural Limpopo is the province that 
has the highest rate of growth.  
Reference to the earlier self is understandably more frequent among middle-aged 
and older groups in the survey. References to the self ten years ago increases 
systematically with household and personal income. Self-comparison is above average 
among people in higher-ranking occupational groups. However, shack and hostel 
dwellers are also inclined to make self-comparisons. By language and province, self-
comparison is most pronounced among the isiXhosa speakers of the Eastern Cape, 
the province that has experienced the second-highest rate of growth in recent years. 
Comparisons with neighbours tend to be concentrated among the less educated 
and rural peoples of South Africa working in the lower occupational ranks. By cultural 
and geographical markers of language and province, above-average comparison with 
                                                 
8
  The South African Rand had lost approximately a third of its value against the US dollar in 
the six months leading up to the survey, hence comparison with Westerners might be seen 
as an economic as well as a cultural reference standard. 
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neighbours is found among Western and Southern Sothos, Ndebeles and residents of 
Mpumalanga. 
Comparison with schoolmates is mainly the prerogative of the younger set still at 
school or pursuing their studies at tertiary level.  
Interestingly, the reference to other race groups has no striking social profile. It is 
claimed by people from a wide range of socio-economic circumstances ranging from 
hostel dwellers and farm workers to persons occupying middle management positions.  
Comparisons with other African countries is popular mainly with younger blacks, 
including students, and the less economically powerful categories, such as the un-
employed and economically inactive. Members of the African Independent Churches 
and residents of Gauteng and the North West score somewhat above average. 
It is predominantly the young black upwardly mobiles, the 'buppies', as they are 
sometimes called, that compare themselves with rich people. 'Buppies' include pro-
fessionals and people in middle-management positions in the economy. However, 
select survey categories associated with less economic power, such as rural dwellers 
and residents of Mpumalanga, also compare themselves to the rich people of South 
Africa 
Categories associated with Western social comparisons focus on city dwellers, 
persons in higher-ranking occupations, and whites and coloured people based in the 
Western Cape. The Western Cape and its capital city of Cape Town are considered 
less African and more European in character than other regions of South Africa.  
The responses elicited by the item on social comparisons suggest that South Afri-
cans feel fairly self-confident and comfortable with their place in society and the world. 
They refrain from making invidious comparisons that generate self-pity and resent-
ment.  
 
Some people say that there are different levels in society which others call 
classes. Here we are thinking of economic levels and not of groups with different 
languages or ethnic groups. To what level in society would you be closest? 
 
Upper level 2 
Upper middle level 6 
Middle level 35 
Lower middle level 22 
Lower level 35 
 
The majority of South Africans regard themselves as lower rather than middle class. 
People in Western industrialised countries tend to see themselves as middle class. 
  
 
 46
The self-assessed social class structure is clear-cut and consistent. It matches ob-
jective levels of income as far as these were reported as in the table below. 
 
 Household income in  Rands 
 
1-579 580-1659       1660+ 
Sel f-assessment     
Upper level 
Upper middle level 
Middle level 
Lower middle level 
Lower level 
1 
2 
18 
21 
58 
2 
3 
24 
25 
45 
5 
11 
53 
18 
14 
   n1625 
The higher occupational ranks of top and middle management, clerical and sales, and 
skilled manual tend to see themselves as middle class. The semi-skilled and unskilled 
regard themselves as members of the lower classes. Occupational sectors follow suit. 
In order of frequency, the sectors managerial and executive, professional, clerical and 
sales, and students regard themselves as more middle class. Thereafter, the per-
centages regarding themselves as lower class increase from mining, to artisans, to 
transport and communications, to services, and finally to the farming sector, which 
regards itself as mainly lower class. 
The apartheid hierarchy is clearly evident in social identity. In the table below, 
blacks tend to see themselves as lower to lower-middle class, whites as middle to 
upper class, with coloured and Indians in between. 
 
 Race Group 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
 
Ø 
Sel f-assessment      
Upper level 2 3 4 6 2 
Upper middle level 3 10 13 23 6 
Middle level 29 41 67 61 35 
Lower middle level 24 21 11 8 22 
Lower level 41 27 6 1 35 
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The geography of apartheid which made a distinction between the peripheral 
homelands and the open urban centre is still engrained in the minds of South Africans 
and seems also to match economic reality. In order of frequency of attributions to 
middle class status, the metropolitan areas and cities rank highest, followed by former 
Indian residential areas, coloured townships, black townships, hostels and shack 
areas. People living in rural and tribal areas see themselves as predominantly lower 
class.  
The other cultural markers can easily be ranked according to popular perceptions 
of socio-economic levels. Regarding home language, English and Afrikaans are 
predominantly middle class. The Tsonga, a minority ethnic group, and Sothos range 
from the middle to lower levels in the order Southern, Western and Northern Sotho. 
Tshivenda speakers place themselves in the lower-middle and lower levels. All the 
Nguni languages rank in the lower level: the dominant languages of Zulu and Xhosa 
as well as the minority tongues of Swazi and Ndebele. 
Religions also follow a fairly well defined class structure. Islam, Hinduism, the 
Dutch Reformed churches, and the Baptist church are solidly middle class. At the 
lower-middle to middle level are the Anglican, Roman Catholic and the mainline 
Christian churches. Charismatics rank slightly lower at the lower-middle to lower 
levels. Predominantly lower class are religious movements, and the African Indepen-
dent Churches as well as the category of people lacking a religious denomination.  
By geographical distribution, Gauteng, Western Cape and the Free State are re-
garded as the most middle-class provinces. The lower-level provinces include the 
former homelands: Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo. The sparsely po-
pulated Northern Cape is also ranked mainly in the lower level. In between lie Kwa-
Zulu-Natal and the North West, which encompass a wider spectrum of rankings be-
tween the lower middle and lower levels.  
The majority of South Africans place themselves on the lowest rung of the social 
ladder. Do workers see themselves as powerless in the workplace?  
 
It doesn't matter what workers or employees do, they can never win against the 
bosses.  
 
One in two agree with the statement. The better-educated higher earners occupying 
higher-ranking positions in the economy are more likely to think that workers can score 
in the workplace. Rural and hostel dwellers and residents of tribal areas feel least 
capable of confronting their bosses. A sense of newfound empowerment is evident 
among township blacks; almost 60 percent disagree with the statement. Southern 
Sotho speakers are more confident than their isiZulu and isiXhosa-speaking cousins. 
Interestingly, Indians, given their business interests, might be expected to side with 
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management. However, Indians are prominent among those who think workers are 
disempowered.  
 
Poor people have only themselves to blame for their situation. 
 
Few South Africans fall into the trap of self-blaming. Less than one in five agree with 
the statement. Workers in the agricultural sector, which ranked lowest in terms of 
socio-economic status above, are least likely to shoulder the responsibility for living in 
poverty.   
 
When I see what rich people have, I feel that I should have the same. 
 
Black and coloured people, with 61 and 45 percent, express greater envy of the rich in 
society. By comparison only 21 percent of the on average relatively better-off Indians 
and whites do so.  
Feelings of relative deprivation ease significantly with increasing levels of edu-
cation and income. The socio-economically peripheral categories of rural and tribal 
dwellers, squatters and hostel dwellers are all more likely to feel envious of the 
privileged in society. The highest levels of envy are among farm workers and the 
unemployed. Six in ten members of the African Independent Churches believe they 
are entitled to a larger share of wealth in society. Up to 70 percent of Western Sotho 
speakers and residents of mainly Western-Sotho speaking North West Province har-
bour resentment against the rich.  
A further item probed South African views of social stratification. 
 
Here are two descriptions of the social differences in this country. With which 
one do you agree?  
A small minority has most of the wealth at the expense of the majority of the 
poor people.  
Or: 
A majority of people are at a middle level, with fewer people who are rich or 
poor. 
 
Views are split down the middle. On average, 51 percent describe South Africa as an 
unequal society. The racial vote is hierarchical with 53 percent blacks pronouncing 
society to be unequal, as do 49 percent of coloureds, 30 percent of Indians, and 39 
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percent of whites. It is mainly the groups in society who rank themselves on the lowest 
stratum that are candid about the glaring inequality. By economic categories, the 
respondents declaring South Africa to be an unequal society include squatters, house-
holds with no income, the mining sector, and the unemployed. By religion, people not 
indicating a religious denomination and members of the African Independent Churches 
regard society as hugely unequal.  
In contrast, English speakers, Hindus and Muslims and residents of the Free State 
are among those most inclined to describe South Africa as predominantly middle 
class. In line with their self-assessed rank in society, above-average percentages of 
Southern Sotho speakers and residents of the North West see society as egalitarian.  
What progress has been made in closing the gap between rich and poor since the 
advent of democracy? The following item probed respondents' views: 
 
In the last ten years, has the difference between rich and poor in this country 
increased, decreased or remained the same? 
 
A majority of 60 percent think wealth differentials have increased. A further 22 percent 
think the difference between rich and poor has remained the same. Only 18 percent 
perceive a closing of the gap.  
The highest proportions, between 70 percent and three-quarters of residents in 
former Indian townships, Southern Sotho speakers and residents of the Eastern Cape 
perceive that inequalities are increasing. At the other extreme, about one in two Zulus 
and rural dwellers living outside the tribal areas think that inequalities have remained 
the same or even decreased.  
 
As regards your conditions of life, are you better or worse off today than 10 
years ago? 
Comparing your present situation to your conditions of life one year ago, how 
well are you off today? 
 
The following picture emerges from the responses to the two questions:  
 
 Living conditions 
 better the same worse 
Compared to ten years ago 34 35 31 
Compared to one year ago 26 47 28 
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The majority of South Africans feel they have progressed or at least not slipped back in 
the past ten years. However, short-term gains are less frequent than long-term gains 
over the past decade. In both the case of longer and shorter-term material gains, it is 
people who have moved up the social ladder who are reaping the rewards. The pro-
portion of those who perceive gains in living conditions increases fairly systematiccally 
with education, household and personal income, and occupational rank. Students and 
younger people are also more likely than others to see progress in their lives.  
Over the past ten years, Indians are most satisfied with improvements in living 
conditions with 47 percent reporting gains, followed by 36 percent gains for whites, 34 
percent for blacks and 28 percent for coloureds. Coloureds are the only group to report 
a net loss, with a higher proportion of 43 reporting a loss rather than a gain.  
English, Northern Sotho and Tshivenda speakers report 'net gains', that is a higher 
proportion reports better than worse conditions, over the ten-year as well as the one-
year period.  
Afrikaans speakers, and Western Sothos are among the few who over the past ten 
years have scored net losses. Between 39 and 40 percent think their living conditions 
have got worse. Net losses over the past year as well as the past ten years are highest 
among the residents of the North West, the home of Western Sotho speakers.  
What is the outlook on the future?  
How do you think things will be for people like yourself in five years' time? Tak-
ing all things together, will things be better, worse, or about the same as today? 
South Africans are mainly optimistic about the future. The single highest percentage, 
41 percent in the total sample, holds hopes for a better future. Slightly over one quarter 
fear things will get worse. 
All race groups, except Indians, are more optimistic than pessimistic about the 
future. Net optimism, that is, the percentage of 'better' less the percentage of 'worse' 
responses, is highest among blacks. Whites are cautiously optimistic; their optimism 
and pessimism is fairly balanced.  
 
 Life in five years' time 
 Better Same Worse 
Black 41 34 25 
Coloured 41 32 27 
Indian 34 23 43 
White 37 29 34 
Ø 41 33 26 
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The outlook on the future is somewhat different in 2002 than in earlier studies. 
Formerly, the pattern was for groups who were by and large satisfied at present to 
express pessimism for the future. Conversely, groups still dissatisfied with life at 
present projected a rosier future. In the present study, only Indians follow the pattern of 
current satisfaction combined with projected dissatisfaction in the future.  
A positive sign is that the younger generations of South Africans are far more 
positive than negative about their life chances. The proportion of positive responses 
outweighs the negative ones by 3:1 and 2:1 in the 16-17 and 18-24 age categories, 
respectively. The proportion decreases successively by each age category and 
reaches 1.4 : 1 for the 35-49 year olds. It is only among persons 50 years and over 
that pessimism slightly overtakes optimism: only 28 percent among over fifties are 
optimists compared to 33 percent pessimists. 
Students and persons with a tertiary level education are among the most optimistic 
of South Africans. Other mainly optimistic sectors of the economy include workers in 
the service sector as well as those in professional, managerial and clerical positions. 
Equal proportions of rural-based individuals and agricultural workers are optimists and 
pessimists. Miners are more often negative than positive. The progression from 
pessimism to optimism increases steadily from unskilled workers right through to the 
highest ranks of captains of industry and commerce.  
Among the provinces, the Eastern and Western Cape emerge as most optimistic, 
followed by Limpopo, Gauteng, and Mpumalanga. The Free State is the only province 
in which negative votes outweigh positive votes. Among the Bantu languages, the 
isiXhosa and minority isiVenda speakers are among the most optimistic. Only among 
the minority of Xitsonga speakers are there more pessimists than optimists. Among 
the larger language groups, Xhosas are more optimistic than Zulus. Persons speaking 
Afrikaans or bilingual English and Afrikaans speakers are more likely to be pessimistic 
than English speakers. By religion, optimists are prominent among the religious 
movements, Baptists and persons with no religious denomination. High proportions of 
optimists are also found in the Anglican Church, African Independent Churches, and 
the Charismatic churches.  
To sum up, eight years into democracy, aspirations are still by and large racially 
defined. South Africa is described as an unequal society in which the gap between rich 
and poor are increasing. Social identities are still haunted by the past. The weaker 
socio-economic groups express dissatisfaction with their jobs if they are lucky enough 
to have employment. The majority of South Africans define themselves as lower rather 
than middle class. Ambitions to do better in life are tempered by worries that personal 
efforts will be thwarted. However, there is optimism for the next generation especially 
among the formerly marginalised groups. The most disillusioned in the new era are 
Afrikaans speakers who fear their culture will be lost in future.  
  
 
 52
Religion and Identity 
 
 
One of the major national projects in the democratic era has been the forging of a new 
common identity for South Africans. The apartheid era entrenched racial identities as a 
person’s passport to opportunities. Forced racial identity put a person in his or her 
place in the South Africa pecking order. Power and prestige was afforded according to 
a person’s position in the apartheid racial hierarchy. South Africa’s new constitution 
guarantees equal opportunities to all. Under the new political dispensation, South 
Africans are encouraged to take pride in their racial identity and the country’s diversity. 
Since 1994, cultural diversity is officially declared one of the country’s strengths. The 
question is whether emergent identities in the new South Africa reflect a better 
understanding of one’s identity in a multicultural society that espouses harmony 
between people from different social, ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds? Do 
South Africans cherish their roots and present multiple identities or do they see 
themselves as South Africans first and foremost? 
Until recently, South Africa presented itself as a Christian country oblivious of the 
fact that all world religions are represented within the country’s borders. Under 
apartheid, the ‘Christian’ label was attached to the country’s education system. At the 
height of apartheid the Dutch Reformed church was referred to as ‘the National Party 
at prayer’. Under democracy, religious diversity is respected and efforts are taken to 
present South Africa as a country that embraces a multitude of faiths. Religious ob-
servance at official functions tends to be of an ecumenical nature. For example, re-
presentatives from several religious persuasions were invited to officiate at the 
installation of Nelson Mandela as president in 1994 and Thabo Mbeki in 1999 and 
2004. In the past South Africans opened many of their meetings with a prayer. In the 
new era a chairperson mindful of the diverse composition of the meeting may call for a 
moment of silence instead. Noteworthy is that the official census records the religious 
affiliations of South Africans although respondents volunteer this information.  
What then are the religious beliefs in a society in which Christianity as the official 
religion of the former government sidelined other beliefs for some forty years in the 
past century?  
Two statements in the survey explored respondents’ attitudes towards a meta-
material world; the first statement asked about hypothetical meta-material influences 
on life, the second about life after death. 
 
Whatever people say, there are hidden forces of good and evil that may help or 
harm me. 
I believe in some form of existence after death. 
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Some two thirds agree with both statements: the first statement is accepted by 65 
percent; the second statement by 68 percent.  
The first statement that affirms hidden forces appears to be attuned to traditional 
African belief systems. Above average percentages of Xhosas and people in the 
Eastern Cape agree with the first statement while speakers of other African languages, 
including isiZulu and Sotho speakers tend to disagree. English speakers mainly agree 
with the first statement. Although numbers are small, belief in forces of good and evil 
are very strong among Indian South Africans regardless whether they are Muslims and 
Hindus. Roman Catholics and the unaffiliated are least likely to have animistic beliefs.  
The statement affirming life after death is endorsed by close on four in five coloured, 
Indian and white South Africans. The belief in an afterlife is far less pronounced among 
blacks, particularly among township residents and squatters. Blacks living in the 
former homelands are more likely to believe in the after life than those living in 
townships or shack settlements. Unsurprisingly, older persons are more likely to pro-
fess belief in life after death. Belief in the afterlife is significantly lower among the un-
employed and in the lower income groups. By province, agreement with the second 
statement is highest in the Eastern Cape and lowest in Gauteng. Southern Sothos and 
Vendas are less likely than other ethnic groups to be among believers. Belief in the 
after life cuts across religious divides in South Africa. Anglicans, Muslims, and Hindus 
are equally and very likely to profess belief in an afterlife. In contrast, only approxi-
mately one in two persons without a religious affiliation do so. About one in two mem-
bers of religious movements state they believe in life after death.  
 
I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad 
people will be punished.  
 
If the notion of existence after death is related to the idea of compensatory justice, 
agreement increases from 68 to 73 percent. An above average 89 percent of coloured 
and Indian South Africans believe in justice after death. Approximately three in four 
whites and seven in ten blacks do. Once again, persons without a religious persuasion 
are least likely to affirm the statement in contrast to eight or nine in ten Muslims and 
Hindus. Afrikaans speakers are most likely to believe in justice after death; Northern 
Sotho or Sepedi speakers least likely. By province, belief is strongest in the Eastern 
and Western Cape and weakest in Gauteng and Limpopo.  
 
I am convinced that my own religion is the only true religion. 
 
South Africans appear to be free of religious bigotry. Less than half, 49 percent, agree 
with the statement. Coloured and Indian South Africans and Afrikaans speakers, with 
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just over 60 percent agreement, are more likely to believe they have the true faith. 
Older people are more convinced than younger people. The belief is particularly strong 
among economically better-off households, in metropolitan areas and in Gauteng. 
Muslims are most likely to think their religion is superior to others followed by members 
of Dutch Reformed churches and Charismatic churches. Persons without a religious 
affiliation are least likely to endorse the statement. 
 
No matter to which group people belong, the most important thing is that 
everybody leads an honest life and is a good human being.  
 
The vast majority, 89 percent, believe that personal integrity is more important than 
religious or any other group affiliation. With 96 percent agreement, this belief is more 
pronounced among coloured, Indian and white than among black respondents. The 
idea that a person should be judged according to character increases somewhat with 
income and education. Members of Dutch Reformed and mainline Christian churches 
are most likely to endorse the statement; persons without a religious affiliation and 
members of African Independent Churches least likely. Only three quarters in Limpopo 
Province agree.  
 
I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God. 
 
One fifth agree. Between 21 and 23 percent of Anglicans, Protestants, Roman 
Catholics and members of the African Independent Churches state they can be happy 
without believing in God. Blacks and whites with 23 and 13 percent agreement are 
more likely to dispense with believing in God than are coloureds and Indians with only 
4 and 6 percent agreement, respectively. Unsurprisingly, over half of those without 
religion agree. Up to one third of Northern and Southern Sothos and people living in 
Limpopo Province believe they can enjoy life without believing in God. 
To what extent do respondents practise their religious beliefs? 
 
How often do you pray? 
Regularly 57 
Often 16 
Sometimes 20 
Hardly ever 4 
Never 4 
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Religion is part of everyday life for many South Africans. Almost three quarters pray 
regularly or often. Less than 10 percent in any race group state that they do not or 
hardly ever pray. Indians pray more often than whites and coloureds. Blacks pray least 
often. Praying is more common among women than men, among older than younger 
respondents, and among higher income earners including professionals and managers. 
Afrikaans speakers and residents of small towns engage in prayer regularly. Members 
of the Dutch Reformed church, Muslims, Hindus and Baptists state they pray regularly.  
 
Do you go to religious services? 
Yes, once a week or more often 55 
Yes, sometimes 30 
Hardly ever 8 
Never 7 
 
Presumably, many respondents engage in prayer in their religious community. Over 
half attend religious services on a weekly basis and a further 30 percent less regularly. 
A similar response pattern emerges as for regular prayer. Regular churchgoers are 
found in the partly overlapping survey categories of Afrikaners, small town residents of 
the Free State, and members of the Dutch Reformed churches. Above average 
percentages of Muslims, Hindus, and Baptists participate in weekly religious services.  
Lower than average attendance at religious services is observed for the survey 
categories of squatters, hostel dwellers, persons with Grade 1 to 5 education, and the 
Northern Sotho, Swazi, Ndebele and Zulu language groups. Surprisingly, approxi-
mately one in five persons without a religious affiliation pray regularly and attend a 
weekly religious service. 
 
Faith and religious values should determine all aspects of state and society.  
 
A majority of 69 percent agree the above statement. The desire to subordinate state 
and society to the dictates of faith and religion is characteristic of fundamentalists of all 
religions. However, in the case of South African believers, the endorsement of the 
statement may stem less from fundamentalist fervour than from the conviction that 
society should uphold the moral values of their faith community.  
The respondent groups that have stronger religious beliefs and practice their 
religion in everyday life are more likely to endorse the statement. Over three quarters 
of coloured and Indian respondents think that religious values are all important for 
state and society. Slightly fewer whites than blacks agree, 62 percent versus 69 per-
cent. Tswana and Afrikaans speakers, and members of the Dutch Reformed churches 
and Muslims think faith and religious values should determine all aspects of public life. 
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One detects a conservative element in the response pattern: housewives, agricultural 
workers, and residents of small towns are among those slightly more in agreement 
with the statement while residents of metropolitan areas are less likely to agree. The 
provinces, in which coloureds and Afrikaans speakers dominate, the Western and 
Northern Cape, score above average agreement. Below average agreement comes 
from Northern Sothos and Zulus and the provinces that include their former homelands 
Limpopo and KwaZuluNatal. The lowest percentage endorsement comes from per-
sons with no religion. 
 
I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion. 
 
Some 78 percent agree. Over nine in ten Indian and whites, and eight in ten coloured 
persons state they try to observe the teachings of their religion in daily life. At 75 
percent, agreement with the statement is slightly below average among blacks. The 
response pattern is similar to that for prayer and attendance at religious services. By 
religion, above average agreement is found among Muslims, Hindus, members of the 
Dutch Reformed churches, and Baptists. Roman Catholics score slightly below 
average. By race group, Indians try hardest to live an exemplary life according to their 
religion. Agreement with the statement is higher among women than men, highest in 
the top income bracket, and increases with age and education. A conservative ele-
ment is observed: above average agreement is found among residents of small towns 
and housewives. Above average percentages agreement with the statement come 
from both Afrikaans and English speakers. Xhosa speakers who are mainly resident in 
the Eastern Cape also try to apply religious teachings in everyday life. Below average 
agreement with the statement is found among squatters, hostel dwellers, and transport 
workers.  
Religion is one of the markers shaping people’s self-understanding; nationality, 
measured in terms of language and ethnicity, is the other. How comfortable do South 
Africans feel about mixing with people from other cultural groups? 
 
I feel very close to people of my own religion, whatever their education, wealth 
or political views. 
I feel very close to people of my own group, whatever their education, wealth or 
political views. 
I prefer to be with people who speak my own language. 
 
Seventy-three percent agree with the first and second, and 63 percent agree with the 
third statement. Religious and ethnic affiliations appear to be stronger than affiliation 
by language. There is quite some overlap between feelings of belonging in terms of 
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religious and ethnic affiliation. However, language affiliation is weaker possibly be-
cause language cuts across other divides in society.  
 
                                  Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
Ø 
Close to co-religionists 71 86 87 75 73 
Close to people of own 
ethnic group 
72 84 82 73 73 
Prefer to be with people 
who speak own language  
61 70 59 67 62 
 
The survey categories that express strong religious beliefs and observe religious 
practices more strictly than others tend to feel very close to co-religionists. By religion 
these are mainly the Dutch Reformed churches, Islam and Hinduism and religious 
movements. By ethnicity and socio-economic groups it is Indians and coloureds, 
women – in particular housewives, managers, artisans, small town residents, and 
blacks living in the former homelands that have strong religious ties. By language, 
Afrikaans and bilingual Afrikaans and English speakers are particularly close to co-
religionists. IsiXhosa speakers and residents of the Eastern Cape tend to be closer to 
co-religionists than isiZulu speakers and residents of KwaZuluNatal.  
Persons who feel closer to their own ethnic group include women, coloureds and 
Indians, persons living in the former homelands, the unskilled and economically 
inactive, residents of the Northern Cape and Limpopo, members of the Dutch 
Reformed church, Hindus and Muslims. Below average percentages of Afrikaans and 
English speakers agree with the statement on close group ties. The ethnic marker 
among black South Africans corresponds to languages spoken in the former 
homelands reserved for different ethnic groups (see map above). It is mainly the 
language groups spoken in the north and the east of the country, the large group of 
Sesotho speakers and the smaller language groupings of the Vendas, Tsongas, 
Ndebeles and Swazis, that have the strongest feelings of proximity with their own 
ethnic group. The two largest language groups in the south of the country, the isiXhosa 
and isiZulu speakers, feel less close to their kin people.   
Afrikaans speakers, coloureds and residents of the Western Cape are over-
represented among those who prefer to be with people who speak their own language. 
IsiXhosa and isiNdebele speakers also prefer their own company. Setswana speakers 
and people living in the North West are among those most comfortable to mix with 
people speaking other languages. Although language coincides with the ethnic marker, 
preference for being with people who speak one’s own language follows a completely 
  
 
 58
different pattern than that observed for feelings of proximity to one’s religious or ethnic 
group. The preference to be with one’s own people tends to cut across economic 
status divisions. This suggests that South Africans who are forced to mix with others in 
terms of their occupation or residential situation, feel comfortable mixing with people 
from different cultural backgrounds although they do not necessarily feel close to 
them. Residents of the most cosmopolitan province, Gauteng, are among those who 
feel comfortable in the company of people who speak a language other than their own.  
Religious and ethnic communities tend to preserve their cohesion by preventing 
intermarriage with outsiders. How do respondents feel about mixed marriages? 
 
I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion 
provided they loved each other. 
 
I would be quite happy if a child of mine married someone from a different ethnic 
group if they loved each other. 
 
Seventy-two percent agree with the first and 68 percent agree with the second 
statement. Respondents are somewhat less concerned about religious than ethnically 
mixed marriages. Blacks are most tolerant of mixed marriages, whites least tolerant, 
with the other groups in between. Whites are particularly opposed to mixed marriages 
across the colour line.  
Noteworthy is that mixed marriages are approved by marginal socio-economic 
categories such as former homeland residents, hostel dwellers and squatters. Profes-
sionals and executives as well as persons with no or low incomes are equally tolerant 
of mixed marriages.  
 
                            Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
Ø 
Agree to religious mixed 
marriage 
75 71 62 53 72 
Agree to ethnically mixed 
marriage 
73 68 59 36 68 
 
Members of the Dutch Reformed churches and Muslims are most likely to condemn 
religious mixed marriages; respondents belonging to evangelical, African Independent 
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and Baptist churches are least concerned. Afrikaans speakers are among the most 
conservative.  
Both Afrikaans and English speakers and to a lesser degree Southern Sotho 
speakers oppose ethnically mixed marriages. Zulus, with 68 percent agreement, are 
on average. All other language groups tend be less concerned about mixed marriages 
across the colour divide. Members of the Dutch Reformed church and Muslims are 
strongly opposed to both religious and ethnically mixed marriages.  
 
A good friend is a good friend whether s/he is black or white. 
 
Eighty-six percent agree. Ninety percent of whites and over 90 percent of coloured and 
Indian respondents are colour-blind when it comes to friendship. Blacks with 84 
percent agreement on average, tend to have greater reservations, particularly hostel 
dwellers. The better educated and urban dwellers are more likely than others to agree 
with the statement. Xhosas and Zulus value friendship across the colour line more 
than Sothos. Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Muslims, Hindus and Baptists are more 
prepared to overlook pigmentation than members of African Independent Churches 
and religious movements.   
  In sum, for the majority of respondents interreligious and interethnic marriages are 
no longer taboo as they were under the former political dispensation. Pockets of 
conservatism regarding  intermarriage are found among Christians and Muslims with 
strong religious convictions. Possibly owing to the legacy of forty years of ‘separate 
development’, there are still greater reservations about taking a marriage partner from 
a different ethnic group than from another religion. However, friendships across the 
colour line seem to be taken for granted. 
 Self-perceptions tend to be complex in a multicultural society. A statement probed 
the mix of markers used by South Africans to identify themselves.   
 
People in a country can be in different social groups at the same time. You can 
have a job, a religion, a language, a nationality, you live in a homestead, village 
or a town, you may belong to a political party – and all these things may be of 
different importance to you. If somebody asks you what you are, how would you 
describe yourself.  
 
Descriptions of self varied considerably. Responses were grouped into categories as 
follows: 
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                                                                 1
st
 response        3 responses  
Positive characteristic 34 58 
Personality trait 22 46 
Ethnicity 9 19 
Religion 8 23 
Gender 8 18 
Race group 3 6 
Language 2 8 
Geographical region 2 6 
Other 10 31 
 
The majority of new South Africans prefer to present themselves as individuals rather 
than persons affiliated to a particular grouping in society. Just over a third of respon-
dents described themselves in terms of a positive personal or universal charateristic 
and a further fifth in terms of a personality trait. Worth noting is that personal des-
criptions tend to be mainly positive. There were few mentions of belonging to a socially 
excluded group in society. This response pattern suggests that self-descriptions affirm 
a positive self-image.    
Respondents were allowed up to three self-descriptions. If all three options are 
summed, almost six in ten respondents identify themselves by a positive characteristic 
and almost half by a personality trait. Religious, ethnic and racial identities emerge as 
stronger second and third options. Religion and ethnicity/race compete with each other 
as identities and gender is more important than geographical region. 
Ethnicity as first descriptor is more common among residents of former homelands 
and hostel dwellers, and lower socio-economic groups as defined in terms of income 
and education. Persons with no religious affiliation are more likely than others to 
identify themselves by their ethnic group.  
Gender identities are more common among women than men. Religious identity is 
above average among women, higher income groups, Afrikaans speakers and among 
members of Dutch Reformed and charismatic churches and among Muslims.  
The pattern of first, second and third self-descriptions are striking. Respondents 
who identify themselves as individuals with certain positive characteristics and per-
sonality traits tend also to emphasise their individual characteristics and personality in 
their second and third responses. Respondents who identify themselves along gender 
lines tend to add personal/positive descriptors or religion as further self-descriptors.  
If religion is the first descriptor, personal positive descriptors or ethnicity are most 
likely to be second and third choices. Similarly, if ethnicity is the first descriptor, religion, 
language and gender dominate as further descriptors. 
Race, a minority first option, is followed by a wider range of options.  
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Identity by geographical region is most likely to succeed language as first self-
description.  
In sum, it would appear that self-description divides into two major groupings, 
individual versus group characteristics. The majority of South Africans opt to em-
phasise their individual rather than their collective identity. This is a remarkable finding 
in a formerly colour-coded society and suggests that democracy has empowered 
many South Africans to revise their feelings of self worth. 
 
Unfortunately, people of my group live in less favourable conditions than others. 
 
Agreement with this statement is indicative of a sense of relative deprivation, generally 
a fertile ground for ethnic tensions. Sixty-nine percent express this sentiment. There 
are significant differences by race.  
 
 Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
 
   Ø 
Less favourable conditions for my group 71 78 52 46 69 
 
Whites followed by Indians feel less disadvantaged which is an accurate reflection of 
living conditions. Surprisingly, a higher percentage of coloured than black respondents 
agree with the statement suggesting that coloured South Africans feel they are short 
changed under the new political dispensation. An apt description of coloured feelings 
of resentment is that under apartheid coloured people were not white enough, but now 
under democracy they are not black enough to benefit from equity redress measures. 
Respondents who express feelings of deprivation include persons in the intermediate 
income categories as well as the rural poor. Perceptions of disadvantage are keen 
among hostel dwellers, squatters, isiXhosa and isiNdebele speakers, and people living 
in the poorest provinces of the Eastern Cape and Limpopo. The more affluent Western 
Cape is associated with feelings of deprivation owing to the large concentration of re-
sentful coloured people in that province. Above average agreement with the statement 
on deprivation is found among those without a religious affiliation, the African Inde-
pendent Churches and Charismatics. There are fewer feelings of deprivation among 
township blacks and skilled workers. English speakers and Hindus are among those 
who feel least deprived. Underrepresented among the resentful are Roman Catholics, 
members of the Dutch Reformed and other mainline Christian churches, and Baptists. 
How do respondents see the cleavages in their society? 
Which of the following differences would you consider to be the biggest one in 
South Africa? 
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In order of frequency, the responses are as follows: 
 
Difference between rich and poor  53 
Difference between black and white 31 
Difference between Christians and Muslims 9 
Difference between big cities and the rest of the country 8 
 
In a society obsessed with race it is remarkable that the difference between rich and 
poor is perceived to be greater than racial difference. Under democracy the previously 
disadvantaged expect to catch up on the material advantages previously denied to 
them. On the other hand, income and race are still inextricably intertwined and rising 
unemployment in the new era may easily overshadow race issues. It is therefore 
interesting to observe which emphasis is placed on one or the other cleavage by the 
different interest groupings in society.  
 
 
                   Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White Ø 
Di f ference between .  .  .       
Rich and poor 53 64 56 40 53 
Black and white 30 19 33 42 31 
Christian and Muslim 8 13 9 12 9 
Big cities and the rest  
of the country 
9 5 2 6 8 
 
Coloureds, who are most inclined to feel that their group suffers deprivation in the new 
order, emphasise the difference between rich and poor over the colour divide. 
Coloureds give equal but lesser weights to the black-white and Christian-Muslim 
divides in society. Blacks follow suit in emphasising first the rich-poor and then the 
black-white divides but also draw attention to the gap between the big cities and the 
underdeveloped rural areas. Whites split their vote more equally between the black-
white and the rich-poor divide. A sizeable minority among white respondents voice 
concern about the Christian-Muslim divide. To some extent this concern may have 
been prompted by the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the year before the survey. 
Apart from the massive coloured vote, the respondents who are most concerned 
about the rich-poor divide in South African society tend to be the lower socio-economic 
categories including respondents in the rural homelands and on the urban periphery, 
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farm workers, members of the African Independent Churches, and the intermediate 
income categories. Above average number of ‘rich and poor’ votes come from Lim-
popo, one of the poorest provinces where people live in abject poverty, and from the 
Western Cape, the province with one of the largest concentrations of coloureds where 
rich and poor live cheek by jowl.  
The black-white divide is perceived to be greatest among urban dwellers including 
hostel dwellers, people living in the former Indian residential areas, small towns and 
metropolitan areas. Above average numbers of votes come from Gauteng, the Eastern 
Cape and the Free State. Anglicans, members of mainline Christian churches and 
Hindus perceive black-white differences to be the greatest.   
As might be expected the Christian-Muslim divide is seen to dominate in the eyes 
of the protagonists and those caught in the crossfire. Votes come from the bottom and 
top end of the socio-economic ladder, from the unemployed, housewives, and the 
highest occupational ranks; from the provinces that are home to Indian and coloured 
Muslims, KwaZuluNatal and the Western Cape; from Afrikaans speakers, coloureds, 
and residents of former black townships. Among the religious groupings, Roman 
Catholics are particularly concerned about the Christian-Muslim divide, along with 
Muslims, Baptists, members of religious movements and Hindus.  
It is mainly black groupings that cite the rural-urban divide. People living in the 
commercial heartland of Gauteng and the poorer cousin provinces of the north, Lim-
popo, Mpumalanga and the North West, perceive the gap between urban and rural liv-
ing to be greatest. It is mainly residents in small towns and the metropolitan areas, 
hostel dwellers, persons working in the communications and transport sector, and 
students who see the gap between city and country as the biggest one. Above-
average mention of the rural-urban divide is made by respondents belonging to 
religious movements and those with no religious affiliation.   
South Africa’s progressive Constitution guarantees racial equality. However, equity 
measures to redress past disadvantage such as affirmative action and black economic 
empowerment charters may reintroduce racial tensions in the rainbow nation. The 
following question probes views on race politics. 
 
Obviously there are differences between groups in this country, but they should 
be kept out of politics. 
 
Seventy-one percent agree. Coloureds and whites are more likely than others to think 
that race and politics should not be mixed. By race, percentage agreement is 88 
percent among coloureds, 80 percent among whites, 68 percent among blacks and 65 
among Indians. The notion that racial differences should be kept out of politics is 
particularly strong among higher income groups, among farmers and managers, in 
coloured residential areas and small towns in the Western and Eastern Cape, among 
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Afrikaans and Xhosa speakers, and members of the Dutch Reformed churches and 
Muslims.  
The rainbow symbol epitomises the nation-building project of the first years of 
democracy. The symbol championed by former Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
and South Africa’s first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, caught the 
imagination of the newly united nation in a superb feat of social engineering. The 
heyday of the rainbow was South Africa’s return to the international sports arena and 
the winning of the World Rugby Cup in 1995. The appeal of the rainbow symbol has 
faded during the Mbeki era. During his first term as president, Thabo Mbeki revived the 
notion of the gap between black and white and rich and poor over the rainbow symbol 
of unity in diversity. However, the ideal of the rainbow is still used to jolt the national 
conscience whenever an event occurs that calls into question harmonious racial co-
existence. Similarly, moments of triumph are celebrated in the name of the ‘rainbow 
nation’.  
How do respondents understand the rainbow symbol in 2002? 
 
A lot has been said by religious and political leaders about the rainbow, symbol 
of peace, and about a new covenant with God as a sign for the future of South 
Africa. People differ in what they think about this. Which of the following options 
is closest to yours? 
 
Respondents answered as follows: 
 
For me, it has no meaning at all. 28 
For me, the covenant is a religious matter only and should not be 
used in politics. 
25 
I believe that God has offered to all South Africans, black and 
white, a new covenant for a peaceful life in a common nation. 
47 
 
Almost half believe in the rainbow symbol as a political tool for nation building. The 
other half is fairly equally divided into those for whom the symbol has no meaning or a 
purely religious one.  
There are major differences of opinion among the race groups. Over two thirds of 
Indians and over half of coloured and whites but only 45 percent of blacks see the 
rainbow as a nation-building political symbol.  
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                Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White Ø 
The rainbow .  .  .       
No meaning 30 16 17 19 28 
Religious symbol 25 30 15 29 25 
New covenant for peace in a 
common nation 
45 54 68 52 47 
 
Believers in the rainbow as political symbol tend to be Indians, men, urban dwellers 
and higher income earners including skilled manual and clerical workers. English 
speakers are somewhat more likely than Afrikaans speakers to believe in the covenant 
for a peaceful co-existence between the races. Members of the Dutch Reformed and 
evangelical churches, Muslims, Hindus and Baptists are more likely to believe in the 
rainbow than Roman Catholics and members of the African Independent Churches.  
Interestingly, given the rainbow symbol’s origin, Anglicans and members of the main-
line Christian churches conform to the average.  
Coloured people, small town dwellers and women are among those who are more 
likely to attach a purely religious meaning to the rainbow symbol. Generally, whites 
and coloureds, the two groups that felt race and politics should not be mixed, also 
condemned the mixing of religion and politics.    
Sceptics are more commonplace among lower income blacks, including hostel 
dwellers, shack dwellers and rural people in the former homelands. For Xhosa 
speakers, residents in the Eastern Cape, and persons without a religious affiliation the 
rainbow symbol tends to be devoid of meaning. 
The rainbow was one of the fledgling democracy’s first nation building projects 
championed by its first president. Nelson Mandela’s successor as president of South 
Africa, Thabo Mbeki initiated the even more ambitious panAfrican project of African 
renewal often referred to as the African Renaissance. The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (Nepad), the brainchild of Mbeki, was established early in 2002 to pro-
mote democracy, and economic and social development in Africa. Respondents were 
invited to put forward their views on the ingredients of success for this project.  
 
There is much talk of African Renewal, African Renaissance and Ubuntu these 
days. What is the most important precondition for African Renewal to become 
reality? South Africa must . . . 
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Respondents chose the given options in the following order: 
 
Reform its economy 25 
Reduce social inequality 23 
Develop skills to compete globally 15 
Be proud of its culture and revitalise it 15 
Improve relations with the rest of Africa 7 
Never heard of African Renewal, a vague 
concept, don’t know 
16 
 
The option on reforming the economy is attractive across the racial spectrum but 
particularly to whites. Urban residents, higher income earners, people in top occupa-
tional positions, English and Afrikaans speakers all recommend economic measures 
to put Nepad on track. 
The recommendation to reduce social inequalities is the highest priority option 
among coloured respondents who voiced their feelings on poverty issues in response 
to other survey items. Unsurprisingly, reducing the gap between rich and poor is the 
option most favoured by the economically weaker in society, low-income householders 
and blacks living in the underdeveloped rural areas, shack settlements and hostels. 
Above average percentages of votes come from Zulus and Tswanas and their 
provinces of origin, KwaZuluNatal and the North West. Roman Catholics, Anglicans, 
Baptists, members of religious movements and Muslims urge that steps be taken to 
reduce the gap between rich and poor. 
The skills development option appears to be most favoured by the upwardly mobile 
who wish to improve their career prospects. Votes for this option increase by level of 
education. The option is popular among young people, students, residents in hostels 
and the former black townships, skilled manual workers and members of religious 
movements.  
A diverse group recommend taking pride in and revitalising South Africa’s cultural 
heritage. The culture option is attractive to people in the 25 – 34 age group, shack and 
small towns dwellers, agricultural workers and farmers, and by Xhosas and Zulus. By 
religion, Baptists, members of the mainline Christian churches and the African Inde-
pendent Churches see the need for a cultural revival. 
Some 16 percent stated they had not heard of the concept or it was too vague. 
Black South Africans appeared to be better informed and more interested in the 
question of African renewal. Indians, Afrikaans speakers and members of the Dutch 
Reformed church appeared to be least interested or informed. Older and less edu-
cated respondents were among the least informed.  
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The racial vote on the preconditions for the success of African renewal provides 
insight into political priorities.  
 
 Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White Ø 
The rainbow .  .  .       
Economic reform 22 28 28 40 25 
Social equality 24 30 26 8 23 
Skills development 16 5 8 17 15 
Cultural revival 16 11 9 11 15 
Relations with Africa 8 3 2 4 7 
Disinterest, no knowledge 14 24 26 21 16 
  
Blacks are torn between the need to strengthen their cultural identity and economic 
interests though economic reforms and skills development. Blacks stand most to 
benefit directly from skills development programmes to redress unequal opportunities 
for the formerly disadvantaged in South African society. Coloured and Indians con-
centrate on the twin concerns of economic reform to achieve greater equality in 
society. To a certain extent, white and black opinions converge. The white vote fo-
cuses on economic reform, most likely with a view to competing in a global economy. 
According to this interpretation, skills development is regarded as essential to produce 
a sufficiently qualified workforce to remain competitive in future.   
An index of religiosity was developed based on nine items discussed in this chap-
ter. Items covered the importance assigned to religion
9
, articles of faith
10
, proximity to 
co-religionists
11
, and religious observance in everyday life
12
. Results are shown below.  
 
                                                 
9
  Disagrees: I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God. Agrees: Faith and religious 
values must determine all aspects of society and state.  
10
  Agrees: I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one. Agrees: I believe in a better 
life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished. 
Agrees: I believe in some form of existence after death.  
11
  Agrees: I feel very close to people of my own religion, whatever their education, wealth or 
political views.  
12
  Agrees: I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion. – Prays often 
or regularly.  – Goes to religious services once a week or more often.  
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Religiosity Index Scores  
Not religious 3 
A little religious 11 
Fairly religious 20 
Religious 35 
Very religious 32 
 
According to index scores, the majority of South Africans (67%) are religious or very 
religious. Religiosity increases with age. Women tend to be more religious than men. 
Coloured and Indian respondents are more religious than whites. On average, blacks 
are least religious. By race, the percentages scoring ‘very religious’ include 53 percent 
of coloureds, 52 percent of Indians, 44 percent of whites, and 27 percent of blacks. 
Strong believers are found in Indian and coloured neighbourhoods, in small towns, and 
among farmers, housewives and pensioners. The very religious are overrepresented 
in the Western and Eastern Cape and in the Free State. Over one in two Afrikaans 
speakers are very religious, as are just over one third of English and isiXhosa 
speakers. Muslims and members of the Dutch Reformed Church feel strongly about 
religion. As might be expected, persons who have no affiliation are not religious.  
The lowest scorers on the religiosity index include Zulus, hostel dwellers, shack 
dwellers and residents of KwaZuluNatal and Limpopo.  
Religiosity, as measured by our index, and trust, as measured by the trust index 
introduced earlier, tend to be strongly positively associated. Respondents who are 
more religious also express higher levels of trust in their compatriots.  
In conclusion, South Africans are seeking a common identity that is inclusive of 
cultural diversity. Religion plays an important role in the lives of most South Africans 
and strengthens trust across socio-cultural divides. The rainbow as symbol of strength 
in unity still appeals to South Africans from all walks of life. Less than a decade into 
democracy, conservative views on group affiliations are softening and there appears to 
be greater willingness to interact with people from different religious and ethnic back-
grounds. The taboos of the past are being shed and marriage across language, ethnic 
and religious lines is no longer unthinkable. Nonetheless, there are still reservations 
about intermarriage across the colour line. There are signs that economic inequalities 
threaten the new sense of common purpose. Economic tensions tend to eclipse those 
of racial distancing of the past. New resentments are growing among groups in society 
whose aspirations are overlooked under the new political dispensation. Coloured 
people are of the opinion that their economic aspirations are not being addressed 
while Afrikaans speakers feel the need to hold fast to their particularistic cultural 
values. Of all groups in the survey the Afrikaners are least likely to embrace the rain-
bow nation ideal and most likely to express the wish to remain true to their linguistic 
and religious origins.    
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Polit ical Orientation 
 
 
A legacy of a turbulent past, South Africans take a keen interest in local and national 
politics. What are their views on the political situation in their country in the new era?    
 
What in your opinion is the most serious political problem facing our country 
today?  
 
Respondents were allowed one response only. The individual replies were grouped in 
the following categories: 
 
Unemployment and poverty 40 
Crime 18 
Health including HIV/AIDS 11 
Housing and infrastructure 10 
Other socio-economic problems 7 
Political issues 5 
Discrimination, racism 3 
Corruption and greed 2 
Education 2 
Other 2 
 
Unemployment and poverty top the list of South African woes eight years into demo-
cracy. Economic issues overshadow other tensions in society caused by crime and 
corruption, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the backlog in housing and infrastructure. 
Since 1994 the country’s macroeconomic policy has introduced economic stability and 
modest growth but has not translated into jobs.  
However, perspectives on problems are seen through different prisms.  
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                  Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White Ø 
Most ser ious problem       
Unemployment and poverty 44 39 26 14 40 
Crime 14 31 44 32 18 
Health  12 4 8 5 11 
Housing  12 4 1 2 10 
Other socio-economic  6 8 5 9 7 
Political issues 3 5 7 16 5 
Discrimination 2 4 3 9 3 
Corruption  1 2 2 5 2 
Education 2 1 2 2 2 
 
Concern about lack of income and jobs is highest among blacks with 44 percent and 
drops to 14 percent among whites. It is predominantly the victims of jobless growth 
who express concern about poverty: people living in the tribal areas, particularly in 
Limpopo and Mpumalanga, low income earners, the jobless, and members of the 
African Independent Churches and Charismatics. Health and housing are also of 
greater concern to blacks than any other group.  
Crime and security issues override economic concerns among Indians and whites. 
Poverty and unemployment and crime carry almost equal weight among coloureds. 
Concern with safety is above average among whites, English and Afrikaans speakers 
and in the Western Cape. 
Women as nurturers tend to emphasise health and housing issues to a greater 
extent than men. Residents of KwaZuluNatal, the province hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, are more likely than residents of other provinces to identify health as so-
ciety’s most serious problem. Taking several survey categories together, young white 
male students appear to be most concerned about reverse discrimination. Above-
average percentages of whites list political issues, discrimination, and corruption as 
serious problems in society.  
How do interviewees rate the social elites that can address their problems? 
 
Which of the following influential groups of people do you consider as very 
important or as not very important in South Africa? 
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 Very important 
Church leaders 89 
Members of parliament 85 
Ministers in national government 84 
Bankers 79 
People in big business 79 
Managers of big enterprises 79 
Leaders of political parties 78 
Military leaders 74 
Gang leaders 5 
 
Respondents regard church leaders among the most influential in society followed 
closely by the political and the economic elite. Parliamentarians and ministers are 
considered more influential than the leaders of political parties. In the case of the ruling 
African National Congress, the role of president and political party leader overlap. The 
military are assigned lesser importance by the respondents. Although gang leaders 
may hold entire communities to ransom in some urban areas, they are considered by 
far the least important.  
In the overview table below political leaders include members of the government 
and parliament and party leaders. Bankers, business people and managers are 
grouped together as economic leaders.  
 
 
                    Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White    Ø 
Very important      
Church leaders 88 92 100 87 88 
Political elite 78 81 77 76 82 
Economic elite 80 71 82 78 79 
Military 76 66 80 61 74 
Gang leaders 6 2 2 5 5 
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There is relative consensus on who are South Africa’s elite. Church leaders rank 
ahead of political role players. Political and economic leaders vie for second place with 
the military. Gang leaders fall far behind all others.  
Respondents are unanimous about religious clout. Church leaders have been out-
spoken and impartial critics of society before and after the coming of democracy. 
There is great respect for the role they play as champions of the poor and the down-
trodden. In the survey, there is widespread agreement on the moral guidance provided 
by church leaders especially among women, Indian and coloured South Africans. 
Members of all the diverse religious groupings state that church leaders are very 
influential. Respondents without a religious affiliation are least likely to consider the 
influence of religious leaders as significant.  
Political and economic leaders vie for second place in importance. Blacks, 
coloureds and whites place the economic elite slightly ahead of the political elite. 
Ministers in national government are considered more influential than members of 
parliament by coloureds and whites while the reverse is the case among blacks and 
Indians. Indians, who are influential in the commercial sector, assign a more important 
role to economic than political leaders.  
In many respects, parliament and government are dependent on each other. Since 
1994 politicians have introduced equity policies aimed at transforming the way in 
which business is conducted in South Africa. On the other hand, government openly 
admits that it relies heavily on big business to grow the economy so that it can carry 
out its social programmes. The rural constituencies, women, and the lower socio-eco-
nomic groups appear to have a somewhat greater regard for the influence and the 
prestige of parliamentarians and leaders of political parties than for the importance of 
government ministers. English speakers and residents of South Africa’s commercial 
centre in Gauteng consider big business particularly important.  
The military plays a minor role in internal politics. It is increasingly playing a greater 
role in foreign affairs, in particular in providing peacekeeping forces to oversee treaties 
brokered by the African Union. However, not all of its missions since 1994 have been 
successful. In the survey, Indians and rural respondents assign above average in-
fluence to the military.  
Gang leaders are not considered at all influential. It is possible that the lack of 
endorsement of importance might reflect disapproval of the power gang leaders wield 
over some neighbourhoods, particularly in Cape Town’s coloured residential areas.    
Things being as they are at present, in which one of the following situations do 
people have the best chance of fair and just treatment? 
In court 56 
In a police investigation 23 
When applying for a job 17 
None 4 
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Confidence in the impartiality of the courts is highest, followed at a distance by the 
belief that one will be treated fairly by the police and future employers. The rank order 
of confidence is similar among all race groupings. However, emphases vary strongly 
as shown in the table below: 
 
 
                   Race group 
 
Black Coloured Indian White     Ø 
Fair  t reatment in      
Court 52 70 78 74 56 
Police investigation 26 16 7 5 23 
Job application 18 12 6 12 17 
None 4 2 9 9 4 
 
Blacks spread their confidence votes more evenly to include the police and potential 
employers. There is above-average trust in the police in the former homeland areas 
and among Sesotho speakers. Coloured, Indians and Whites trust the courts above 
other state institutions. Trust in the courts increases with higher socio-economic status 
in terms of education, income and occupation. There is less trust in the courts in the 
former rural homelands and among speakers of African languages. Interestingly, in 
spite of affirmative action, a substantial proportion of whites still feel they will receive 
fair treatment when applying for a job.  
Cynics, who state they do not stand a chance of fair and just treatment, tend to be 
older respondents, those based in metropolitan areas, and English speakers.  
 
If you keep out of politics you have peace and a clean conscience. 
 
Sixty-one percent agree. Agreement varies significantly by race: 61 percent among 
blacks, 76 percent among coloureds, 54 percent among Indians and 52 percent 
among whites. The preference to stay out of politics is strongest among coloureds and 
might be a reflection of their political alienation expressed as relative deprivation in 
other survey responses reported earlier. Voter apathy is notorious in the coloured com-
munity. Other survey categories that are associated with political abstinence partially 
overlap with coloured identity and include the commercial farming areas, agricultural 
and communication and transport workers, and housewives. Political abstinence in-
creases systematically with a decrease in income. English speakers are particularly 
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keen to be involved in politics while Southern Sothos, Xhosas and Afrikaans speakers 
are more eager to stay out of politics.   
Even if some South Africans have little interest in political activism, they have 
strong opinions about political leaders.  
Think of political leaders in our country. Which leaders do you admire most? 
Favourites among political leaders are as follows:  
 1
st
 choice 2
nd
 choice 
Nelson Mandela 55 18 
Thabo Mbeki 13 18 
Ruling ANC leaders
13
 6 25 
Black opposition leaders
14
 8 12 
White opposition leaders
15
 6 12 
Former homeland leaders
16
 1 2 
Religious and cultural leaders
17
 .5 2 
Black historical icons
18
 .5 1 
Apartheid leaders & icons
19
 .5 1 
None 12  
                                                 
13
  Includes provincial and national leaders of the ANC and its alliance partners. Prominent 
mentions include deputy president Jacob Zuma; leader of the women’s league and Nelson 
Mandela’s former wife, Winnie Mandela; Cyril Ramaphosa, former trade union leader turned 
black-economic-empowerment businessman; and former trade unionist now Gauteng 
premier Mbazima Sam Shilowa.  
14
  Prominent mentions include Inkatha Freedom Party leader Mangosutho Buthelezi, United 
Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa, and Pan-Africanist Congress leaders Patricia 
de Lille and Stanley Mokgoba.  
15
  Most votes go to Nobel Peace prize winner and leader of the New National Party, FW de 
Klerk, and to the leader of the Democratic Party/Democratic Alliance, Tony Leon. The NNP 
and the DP formed the DA to fight the 2000 municipal elections. They broke up the alliance 
in October 2001 and the NNP formed a new alliance with the ANC in advance of the 2004 
national elections.   
16
  Most prominent mention goes to former Bophuthatswana president Lucas Mangope. 
17
  Includes Nobel peace prize winner, emeritus Archbishop Tutu, and popular sports people, 
television presenters, etc.   
18
  Prominent mention goes to ANC hero, Chris Hani, assassinated in April 1993, among other 
political activists in the struggle against apartheid.  
19
  Mainly mention of former National Party leaders of the apartheid era including former presi-
dent PW Botha and Pik Botha. One vote goes to the architect of apartheid, Dr H F Verwoerd. 
  
South Africa’s New Democrats 
 75
Nelson Mandela, who served as South Africa’s first democratically elected president 
for one term from 1994 to 1999 is the first choice of over half. If second votes are 
counted, almost two thirds declare Mandela as their hero. Thabo Mbeki, the country’s 
second president in the democratic era, follows at a distance with some 13 percent of 
votes in the first round rising to 18 percent in the second round.  
Overall, the ruling African National Congress leaders take the largest share of all 
votes starting with Mandela and Mbeki. By comparison black and white opposition 
leaders attract a minority of votes.    
Noteworthy is that respondents remember leaders of the past on both sides of the 
political divide. Historical icons include ANC leaders who died in the struggle against 
apartheid such as Steve Biko as well as Dr H F Verwoerd, the architect of the grand 
plan of separate development. Homeland leaders, who were supported by the apart-
heid government, are still admired mainly by respondents in the tribal areas of the 
former homelands. Tribute is paid to stalwarts in the liberal opposition under National 
Party rule such as Helen Suzman whose voice is still heard. 
The choice of Mandela as South Africa’s icon of freedom and democracy is un-
surprising as he is recognised as a wise elder statesman not only in South Africa but 
worldwide. In this survey he is unanimously voted as most respected leader. He at-
tracted some 62 percent of Indian votes, 55 percent of black votes and 45 percent of 
white and coloured votes in the first round, and between 63 and 75 percent in all 
groups in both rounds.  
If a comparison is made between first and second votes, the support for Mandela is 
overwhelming as is the general support for the ruling African National Congress, the 
party that attracted an over two thirds majority in the 2004 national elections. In the 
majority of cases, Mandela, Mbeki and ruling ANC leaders featured either in the first or 
second vote. Generally, if respondents did not choose Mandela in the first round of 
voting, they did so the second time around. Conversely, some 41 percent of respon-
dents who voted for Mandela in the first round, voted for Mbeki in the second round. 
Those who cast their first vote for Mbeki or an ANC leader, gave Mandela or another 
ruling ANC leader as their second choice. The only exceptions are respondents who 
opted for other historical icons as first choice. They were as likely to use their second 
vote to support a white opposition leader or to pay their respects to a white historical 
icon.  
Mandela, affectionately known by his clan name of Madiba, is the revered favourite 
of all South Africans. There is no distinct profile for his supporters. There are stark 
contrasts between the profiles of the other political supporters. Mbeki, who is a Xhosa 
from the Eastern Cape, has a strong following among blacks, and in the former 
homelands. He is much admired by his own people in the Eastern Cape.  Respect for 
Mbeki increases with decreasing age. Support for ANC leaders is concentrated in the 
lower socio-economic groups and among rural residents of the northern provinces of 
the North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga that include many of the former home-
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lands. Recognition of black opposition leaders is found mainly among the Zulu of 
KwaZuluNatal, the home of Mangosutho Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party. White 
opposition supporters include the overlapping survey categories of Afrikaans and 
English speakers, coloureds and whites, and residents of the Western Cape and Kwa-
ZuluNatal provinces. Homeland leaders are still remembered mainly by Setswana 
speakers in the North West and to a lesser degree by isiZulu speakers in KwaZulu-
Natal. Whites and residents of KwaZuluNatal are overrepresented among those who 
could not name a respected leader.  
In Mandela, South Africans have found a common cause. His leadership has 
smoothed over many of the tensions in a once deeply divided society. In contrast, 
there are multiple groups that strongly reject Mbeki in response to a further probe.  
Which political leader in our country do you most dislike? 
Thabo Mbeki 24 
Black opposition leaders 17 
White opposition leaders 13 
ANC leaders 6 
Former homeland leaders 2 
Apartheid leaders & icons 1 
Religious and cultural leaders .5 
None 37 
Rejection of Mbeki increases with income. It is concentrated in urban areas, parti-
cularly in metropolitan Gauteng and among English and Afrikaans speakers. Members 
of all race groups express dislike of Mbeki, particularly Indians. Among blacks, anti-
pathy is particularly intense among Zulus in KwaZuluNatal.  
 
                     Race group 
 Black Coloured Indian White    Ø 
Most dis l iked leader      
Mbeki 20 35 50 38 24 
Black opposition  19 11 6 4 17 
White opposition 15 10 10 5 13 
ANC leaders 4 6 2 16 6 
Homeland 2 1 - - 2 
Mandela 1 2 2 2 1 
None 38 36 28 33 37 
  
South Africa’s New Democrats 
 77
Political tensions come to the fore in response to the probe on disliked leaders. Whites 
tend to oppose mainly black leaders in the ruling and opposition parties. Blacks tend to 
reject all leaders not in the ANC fold. Coloured people seem to be caught in the 
middle; substantial percentages reject both white and black opposition leaders. Indian 
voters are most likely to reject Mbeki.   
Antipathy to black opposition leaders is strongest in the tribal areas and shack 
settlements. By ethnicity, isiZulu and isiXhosa speakers and to a lesser degree Wes-
tern and Northern Sotho speakers state they dislike leaders not in the ANC fold. Dis-
like of white opposition leaders is strong in the commercial farming areas and among 
Zulu speakers. Coloured voters have little respect for both white opposition leaders 
and Mbeki. Residents in the North West province have a love-hate relationship with 
homeland leaders; they both admire and reject their traditional leaders.  
As might be expected, respondents in the Western Cape and KwaZuluNatal, the 
two provinces that have resisted ANC rule since 1994, are overrepresented among 
those who express an aversion to some political leaders. A quarter of KwaZuluNatal 
respondents reject Mbeki and some 16 percent of Western Cape respondents reject 
other ANC leaders. IsiZulu speakers are prominent among those who loathe Mbeki, 
black and white opposition leaders.  
 
Thinking of political leaders whom you support, would you agree or disagree 
with the following statements? 
 
Agree Disagree 
Most people like myself support these leaders. 71 29 
Even if these leaders act in a way I do not 
understand, I would still support him/her in an 
election. 
 
38 
 
62 
Given the situation in the country, these leaders 
cannot do very much to improve our lives. 
51 49 
 
The majority are convinced that members of their own group share their opinions of 
political leaders. Rural people are overrepresented. Blacks (74%) are surer of their 
views, followed closely by coloureds (69%), and then Indians (56%) and whites (57%). 
Only 38 percent are prepared to support their preferred politician unconditionally. 
The majority openly disagree. Disagreement is particularly strong among Indians, 
English speakers, and urban dwellers. Rural constituencies are more prepared to 
support political leaders without question; Xhosas more so than Zulus. By race, 41 
percent of blacks, 35 percent of coloureds, 19 percent of Indians and 26 percent of 
whites would support leaders without reservation. 
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There is widespread scepticism about what political leaders can achieve to improve 
the quality of life of ordinary people. Again cynicism is stronger among Indians. House-
holds in the lower income brackets are also more doubtful.      
These opinions indicate a considerable degree of realism and political common 
sense among respondents – at least in principle. Voting patterns show that the majority 
of South Africans continue to support the African National Congress although the 
ruling party has by its own admission fallen short on achievements to improve the 
living standards of the poor.  
Respondents were asked for whom they would vote in the next elections. The dis-
tribution of votes is shown in the table below. Percentages are based on the res-
pondents that replied to the probe. Some 82 percent gave a first choice and 74 percent 
a second choice. The table groups together the Africanist parties, the PanAfrican Party 
and the Azanian People’s Party, and the small Indian party of the Minority Front led by 
Amichand Rajbansi. The African Christian Democratic Party and the United Christian 
Democratic Front provide a forum for Christian values. The parties on the conservative 
right include the more moderate Freedom Front and the conservative hardliners: the 
Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and the Hersichtige Nationale 
Partei.  
 
If national elections were held tomorrow, for which party would you vote? What 
would be your second choice? 
 
1
st
 choice 2
nd
 choice 
African National Congress ANC 64 28 
Democratic Party/Alliance DP/DA 8 10 
New National Party NNP 5 9 
Inkatha Freedom Party IFP 5 6 
United Democratic Movement UDM 3 6 
Africanist parties & Minority Front AZAPO, PAC, 
MF
20
 
2 9 
Christian parties ADCP,UCDF
21
 2 3 
Conservative white parties FF,CP,AWB,HNP
22
 .5 1 
South African Communist Party SACP - 2 
Non-voters 13 27 
                                                 
20
  Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo), Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Minority 
Front (MF) 
21
  African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP). 
22
  Freedom Front (FF), Conservative Party (CP), Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), 
Herstigte Nasionale Partei (HNP) 
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The African National Congress is the winner by far. Its alliance partners include the 
South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(Cosatu). The two mainly white opposition parties, the liberal Democratic Alliance led 
by Tony Leon and the New National Party, launched in 1998 as successor to the 
former ruling National Party, claim less than 10 percent in the first and second round of 
voting. The Inkatha Freedom Party that is still party to South Africa’s power-sharing ar-
rangement in 2002, only musters some 5 percent of votes. Some 3 percent of votes go 
to the United Democratic Movement, founded in 1997 by Eastern Cape leader Bantu 
Holomisa in partnership with Roelf Meyer, former National Party cabinet minister and 
key negotiator of South Africa’s negotiated settlement in the early 1990s. Parties that 
appeal to particular interest groups, Christians and Africanists, have followings of only 
some 2 percent of votes in the first round.  
If responses are broken down by race, party preferences reveal that voting is still a 
racial census.  
 
 Race group 
 
      Black Coloured   Indian White 
First  and (second)  
choices 
    
ANC  72(31)  41(22)  43(14)  6(5) 
DP/DA  3(6)  22(23)  12(19)  51(39) 
NNP  2(6)  21(23)  21(23)  20(20) 
IFP  6(6)  1(2)  2(7)  2(7) 
UDM  3(6)  4(7)  5(2)  1(1) 
Africanist & MF  2(11)  -(4)  2(14)  -(-) 
Christian   1(3)  4(4)  -(-)  4(3) 
Conservative right   -(0)  -(-)  -(2)  4(4) 
SACP  -(2)  -(1)  -(-)  -(-) 
Non-voters  13(29)  8(16)  14(19)  14(22) 
 
Over 70 percent of blacks vote for the ANC. One in two whites support the DA. 
Coloureds and Indians fall somewhere in between; they split their votes between the 
three largest parties of the ANC, the DA and the NNP. Although the ANC has gained a 
multiracial following by 2002, blacks dominate in terms of sheer numbers. Trans-
formed into the New National Party, the former exclusively white NP has found some 
support among Indians and coloureds but not among blacks. 
  
 
 80
The party profiles are as follows:  
The African National Congress is the party of choice for black respondents. The ANC 
is attractive to all age groups and to both rural and urban dwellers. It has a following 
among income earners as well as the unemployed. It is a first choice for large numbers 
of isiXhosa speakers and a second choice for isiZulu and Western Sotho speakers.   
The Democratic Alliance is supported by the better-educated, economically 
stronger, mainly white Afrikaans and English speakers in the most affluent provinces 
of the Western Cape and Gauteng.  
The New National Party’s constituency is also in Gauteng and the Western Cape. It 
has twice as many Afrikaans than English speakers. The formerly white party has 
gained a substantial following among coloured and Indian voters. Average income and 
educational levels are below that of the DA. The service sector is well represented in 
the NNP.  
The Inkatha Freedom Party is the male-dominated party of the Zulus. It has a large 
following among older voters with little income and education. Over four fifths who 
make the IFP their first choice are Zulus based in KwaZuluNatal. A substantial pro-
portion of those who make the IFP their second choice are likely to be economically 
somewhat better off and resident in Gauteng.  
The United Democratic Movement has the strongest following in the tribal areas of 
the Eastern Cape. Although numbers are small, it is attractive to women, low-income 
earners and the unemployed. 
The Africanist parties and the Minority Front are attractive to blacks, Indians and 
coloureds. Their constituencies tend to be young. True to their ideological foundations, 
the Africanist parties have a following among a wide range of African ethnic groups.   
The Christian parties have a strong following among the older age cohorts, among 
women and among Setswana speakers of the North West.    
The conservative parties are dominated by white Afrikaans speakers from the 
stronger socio-economic classes. The conservative parties are well represented in the 
Free State, Gauteng, the North West.   
Non-voters include respondents in a wide range of age and socio-economic cate-
gories. Zulus make up the single largest group of non-voters.  
It is instructive to compare first and second choices to assess the distance and 
affinities between political parties.  
ANC supporters tend to vote for the ANC the second time round. Alternatively, a 
few vote for an Africanist party or else they abstain.   
Since 1994, the Democratic Party and the New National Party have variously 
competed with each other to attract voters away from their rivals or have joined forces 
to pool votes. The two parties formed the Democratic Alliance to fight the 2001 
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municipal elections only to part company again in 2002. The affinity between the DA 
and the NNP is fairly close judging by respondents’ voting patterns. DA and NNP sup-
porters give their second vote to their own or the other party. A few also consider 
voting for the ANC and the IFP, or else they abstain.  
UDM supporters opt for a wide range of second choices including the ANC, an 
Africanist party and the DA. They are more likely to give their second vote to the ANC 
than their own party. 
IFP supporters split their second vote between the ANC and their own party.  
When voting the second time round, the Christian party supporters are more likely 
to repeat their first choice but also consider the ANC.  
Africanists include the ANC and the NNP as well as their own party in their second 
choices.  
The members of the various conservative parties exchange votes. Only one in five 
cast their second vote in favour of the more liberal DA.  
 
Earlier on, the divide between rich and poor and economic inequalities were identi-
fied as the critical issues in society. The resolution of these issues has high conflict 
potential, as the response to the following statements shows:   
 
Think of the serious problems and conflicts which have developed in our society 
in recent times. Which one of the following descriptions do you agree with most? 
 
 Agree 
Unfortunately, co-operation between different groups 
continues to be difficult. 
53 
In spite of everything, co-operation between different groups 
works reasonably well. 
47 
 
Slightly over half think that intergroup co-operation leaves to be desired. Above 
average percentages hold this viewpoint among urban blacks, residents of metro-
politan areas, intermediate income groups and occupational ranks, and Setswana, 
Afrikaans and English speakers.  
How do respondents appraise government performance? 
 
By and large, I think that our present government is leading the country in the 
right direction. 
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Overall over half agree. However, opinions vary significantly by race.  
 
Race group  
Black Coloured Indian White       Ø 
By and large, I think that our 
present government is leading the 
country in the right direction. 
 
57 
 
38 
 
36 
 
29 
 
52 
 
The black constituency that overwhelmingly supports the African National Congress 
gives a much higher approval rating than others. Approval ratings are highest in the 
lower socio-economic groups according to education and income, in the former rural 
homelands, and among hostel dwellers. Xhosas tend to be more positive than Sothos 
who in turn are more positive than Zulus. By religion, agreement with the statement is 
highest among members of the mainline Christian churches and the African Inde-
pendent Churches.   
What type of social, economic and political order would respondents like to live in? 
The following question explores this. 
 
In your mind, which country comes closest to being an ideal country, the country 
that other countries should attempt to be like? 
 
Answers were grouped as follows: 
 
South Africa 37 
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and other African countries 
10 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand  26 
United Kingdom 6 
Europe 5 
Russia, Middle East and Asia 4 
Don’t know 8 
None 5 
 
Over one third projects its own country as ideal. A similarly large group name pros-
perous western democratic countries and trading partners. Respondents are split into 
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two fairly equal sized clusters. South Africa and African countries compete with the 
mainly more prosperous countries of the West as ideal countries in the respondents’ 
views. The single largest vote goes to South Africa. Feelings of patriotism, national 
pride and new found self-esteem may play a role among those who say South Africa 
lives up to their image of an ideal country.  
South Africa fits the image of ideal country across the racial divide. South Africa 
attracts the single largest percentage of votes among members of all races.  
 
 
                         Race Group 
     Black Coloured  Indian   White    Ø 
Ideal  country   
 
  
South Africa 37 50 30 32 37 
Other SADC and Africa  12 1 4 1 10 
US, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand 
24 28 26 32 26 
United Kingdom 5 6 2 11 6 
Europe 4 6 4 12 5 
Russia, Middle East, Asia 3 3 20 1 4 
Don’t know, no response 9 5 9 6 8 
None 5 2 6 5 5 
 
The South African response is more attractive to older than younger respondents; 
whereas Western immigration destinations such as the United States, Canada, Austra-
lia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are more attractive to younger people than 
older respondents. Metropolitan residents particularly favour the United Kingdom.  
As might be expected, the perceptions of the ideal country are biased in favour of 
respondents’ historical and ethnic roots. White South Africans are more likely than 
others to idealise the countries where their ancestors were born in the United Kingdom 
and Europe. In the case of Indians and residents of KwaZuluNatal, India is more likely 
to be considered the ideal country.  
The African vote is concentrated among black South Africans who have their roots 
on the continent, in particular among rural-based respondents, lower income earners 
and among those who have greater contact with the rest of Africa. Not unsurprisingly, 
votes for other African countries are more commonplace among respondents living in 
the provinces bordering on SADC countries such as Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the 
North West; and among transport and communication workers. Ethnic groups located 
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inland and in the south such as Sesotho and Xhosa speakers are least likely to vote 
for another African country.  
To sum up, political orientations indicate that the new democracy still has a long 
way to go to meet even the most basic needs of its people. There are divergent views 
on the political priorities of the country and which leaders and political parties are best 
equipped to address the challenges. Co-operation between groups is still lukewarm 
and there is little confidence in the performance of leaders. Given the country’s long 
history of division, it is not surprising that political party support is still broadly along 
racial lines. However, there are signs of a softening of such divisions. Earlier chapters 
noted the emergent sense of personal pride among South Africans. Political orient-
tations also hint at an emergent sense of common purpose and confidence in the fled-
gling democracy. South Africans from different social and cultural backgrounds choose 
their former president, a symbol of freedom and reconciliation, as their most favoured 
political leader and their own country as their ideal. Although the overwhelming majo-
rity back the ruling party, a slight majority would also reconsider supporting a party that 
fails to lead. South Africans value the moral influence of their religious leaders who are 
not afraid to speak out on political issues of the day and to criticise political leaders. 
These are subtle indications of a growing democratic maturity. 
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Democracy and Harmonious Co-existence 
 
 
The majority of South Africans have spent only a few years living in a democracy. 
Therefore, it will be important to know how people deal with underlying tensions in-
herited from an earlier era. How are members of a formerly deeply divided society 
coming to terms with a new, progressive constitution that regards all citizens as equal? 
Are South Africans prepared to settle political differences amicably according to demo-
cratic rules? Will they make the effort to try to live on good terms with compatriots? Do 
they really believe in the basic tenets of democracy or do they feel the need to develop 
home grown alternatives that better reflect deep-seated cultural values? Are people 
with different religious and ethnic affiliations prepared to live together in harmony in the 
newly unified state, to respect others that are different, and to regard cultural diffe-
rences as a source of enrichment? Finally, there is the question of the relationship 
between democracy and solidarity: are democratic beliefs conducive to or associated 
with greater respect for fellow citizens and harmonious co-existence? 
These questions are explored in this chapter. In a fledgling democracy it might be 
useful to start with a question on the most important priorities for government action in 
the new democracy.  
 
What is the most important thing the government should achieve in the present 
situation? 
 
Total honesty of government 30 
Efficiency in managing the economic development of the country 24 
Enforcement of the law 24 
Improving public health services 15 
African renewal; renaissance; ubuntu 7 
 
Priorities in approximate order of importance are an honest government, economic 
development, rule of law, and efficient health services. African renewal, still a fairly 
new concept at the time of the survey, is considered a much lesser priority. Import-
antly, an honest government, an essential prerequisite for democracy, is considered 
the top priority. It appears that respondents value transparency and openness above 
all and assume that a government accountable to the people will serve their interests 
best. Coloured respondents and members of the Dutch Reformed churches are most 
likely to stress the need for a government beyond reproach. Economic development is 
a particularly strong priority for top-level managers and its perceived importance 
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increases with education. Concern with law enforcement increases with age and is 
somewhat stronger among men and metropolitan dwellers. Public health is an above 
average priority among groups who are most dependent on the service including 
blacks and women generally, as well as respondents from lower income households 
and Limpopo, the second poorest province. Black respondents are most likely to place 
African Renaissance on the political agenda. Of all South Africa’s ethnic groupings, 
Xhosas and Zulus are most likely to see African goals as important.  
It is often argued that citizens in new democracies are predisposed to judge the 
performance of democracy primarily in terms of improving living standards rather than 
abstracts such as regular elections, competing political parties, and freedom to criticise 
government. Ordinary citizens expect democracy to deliver at least the basic neces-
sities of life such as food, water, shelter and education. What are the attitudes of res-
pondents to statements about the basic tenets of democratic rule – a multiparty system, 
free elections, accountable government, freedom of the press and an independent 
judiciary? The results are given in descending order of support.  
 
A president whose power is balanced by parliament.   
Or:   
A president who can act without interference by members of 
parliament. 
First 
option: 
 
71 
It is permissible to falsify election results in order to allow the 
better candidate for the country to win. 
 
Disagree: 
 
70 
Control of newspapers by government in order to prevent disunity. 
  
Or:   
Newspapers free to criticise government and enjoy freedom of 
expression.  
Second 
 option: 
 
66 
One political party only, with a single plan for the country’s future. 
  
Or:   
More than one party, each with its own plan for the country’s 
future.  
Second 
option: 
 
56 
Judges who follow instructions given by the government. 
  
Or:   
Judges who apply the law whatever the government says. Second 
option: 
 
53 
 
Substantial majorities are convinced that the executive should be answerable to the 
legislature, that elections should not only be free but also fair and the press should be 
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free. Smaller majorities favour a multiparty system and want an independent judiciary. 
Women tend to be more scrupulous than men when it comes to condemning the 
falsification of election outcomes.  
Seasoned voters are more attuned to democratic ideals than new voters. Between 
three quarters up to over 80 percent among whites agree compared to between half 
up to 70 percent among blacks. Coloured and Indian voters fall somewhere in 
between.  
There are two exceptions. The result on the role of the judiciary comes as a sur-
prise as South African courts have a long history of upholding justice in spite of restric-
tive laws. In the new era the constitutional court has overturned several government 
decisions that did not meet the principles underlying South Africa’s new constitution. 
Our survey results suggest that an independent judiciary is more important in urban 
areas and among the higher socio-economic groups in terms of education, occupation 
and income. Unusually, Indians are least likely to agree with the statement that judges 
should be independent when applying the laws of the land.  
All race groups have reservations regarding a multiparty system. Recent debates 
have showed up the fundamentally different understandings of the role of the oppo-
sition in a multiparty system. Critique of government is considered a threat to the new 
democracy that will undermine unity of purpose in meeting societal goals. In success-
sive rounds of national, provincial and local government elections, the African National 
Congress has taken control of all the provinces and the majority of the municipalities to 
achieve its goals.  
What do respondents think about the free expressions of ideas, opinions and inter-
ests – prerequisites of democracy? 
 
 Agree Disagree 
It is harmful for society if individuals or groups have different 
opinions and pursue different interests.  
55 45 
It is normal that people have different opinions and pursue 
different interests as long as they respect the rules. 
86 14 
And: 
  
 Agree 
A state authority that controls particular interests and 
preserves social harmony. 
Or: 
Freedom for people to pursue different interests provided they 
respect the rules.  
 
29 
 
 
71 
 
  
 
 88
There is a split vote on the first item where the risk of harming society is evoked. How-
ever, when options are offered in the second and third items that allow for individual 
freedom without harming the social order (“provided people respect the rules”), sub-
stantial majorities agree. Veteran voters are more supportive of individual freedoms 
than beneficiaries of the universal franchise since 1994. Collectivist values which place 
group interests and social harmony ahead of individual self-centred interests may also 
play an important role here. Up to 70 percent of Indian voters agree that differences in 
opinions and interests might harm society.  
The liberal options tend to find the greatest favour among the better educated and 
in urban and metropolitan areas. Interestingly, and possibly a sign of the promotion of 
the empowerment of women under democracy, female respondents appear to be more 
eager than their male counterparts to pursue personal development. There is a regular 
progression from conservatism to liberalism in line with the old social order of the 
former political era on the third item. For example, blacks are among the most conser-
vative and favour state control over individual freedoms, coloureds are somewhat less 
conservative, while over eight in ten Indians and whites vote for individual freedoms.   
Further questions probed respondents’ views on the best recipe to achieve peace-
ful co-existence and to manage cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in the country.    
There are many countries like ours – that is, a country with different religious, 
language and ethnic groups. There are different forms of government in these 
countries and different opinions about what is the best way of ruling such a 
country. We will give you some of these opinions.  
Please tell us whether you find each of the following opinions acceptable or not.   
 
Acceptable 
The country is divided up and groups form their own states. 29 
The largest group rules, and the other groups accept what is 
decided. 
26 
One group rules over the others, and people who refuse to 
accept this have to keep quiet or leave. 
22 
A single party open to everyone rules without opposition. 34 
A joint government rules in which all major groups share power. 80 
All people vote for any party they like, and the winning party 
(parties) rules (rule) with other parties in the opposition.  
85 
 
The most extreme solution to keeping the peace in a multi-ethnic society is partition. 
Some 29 percent agree with this solution to keeping the peace. This option is ac-
ceptable to an above-average 40 percent of whites, in particular to Afrikaners, who still 
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hanker for self-determination in an Afrikaner homeland. The Freedom Party was ori-
ginally formed to put the idea of a volksstaat to the new government of national unity in 
1994. Partition is also considered a reasonable solution among minority African ethnic 
groups such as the Ndebele and the Tsonga.  
Some 28 percent of blacks find it acceptable that the largest group should rule. A 
quarter of whites and 23 percent of coloureds support the second option but only 9 per-
cent of Indians do so. Above-average percentages of township blacks, the unemployed, 
and rural agricultural workers find it acceptable that the largest group should rule.   
The third option – might is right – finds somewhat less support than the second 
option. Some 23 percent of blacks, 18 percent of whites, 15 percent of coloureds and 6 
percent of Indians favour the third option. Mainly black respondents in the lower socio-
economic sectors of society are in favour of a dominant group excluding all others.  
Over a third would be prepared to accept a one-party state. Blacks with 38 percent 
and Indians with 34 percent are more in favour of the fourth option than coloureds with 
22 percent and whites with 19 percent. Mainly lower socio-economic groups in the 
rural areas approve of a one-party state. Interestingly, this option also finds favour with 
younger respondents. Whites are least in favour of an ethnic majority rule or a one-
party state. Indians would prefer a one-party state to ethnically based majority rule.  
A power-sharing arrangement enjoys strong support from all race groups with 85 
percent of total votes. Power-sharing is approved by 89 percent of Indians, 82 percent 
of blacks, 73 percent of whites and 71 percent of coloureds.  
Simple majority rule – the winner takes all – is the most acceptable solution. It 
pleases people in urban and rural areas and Afrikaans and English speakers. It re-
ceives somewhat greater support from Southern Sothos and Xhosas than Zulus.  
Acceptance of different forms of political regulation is revealing. However, prefe-
rence for one form over the others is a more important consideration.  
Which one of the above options do you feel is the best solution for our country?    
All people vote for any party they like, and the winning party 
(parties) rules (rule) with other parties in the opposition. 
45 
A joint government in which all major groups share power. 34 
A single party open to everyone rules without opposition. 8 
The largest group rules, and the other groups accept what is 
decided. 
5 
One group rules over the others, and people who refuse to 
accept this have to keep quiet or leave. 
5 
The country is divided up and groups form their own states. 4 
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According to results the real contest is between only two options: a multiparty system 
and a power-sharing solution.  
 
                               Race Group 
 Black Coloured Indian White     Ø 
Majority rule 45 42 23 52 45 
Joint government 33 39 68 28 34 
Single party 9 8 4 4 8 
Largest group rules 5 4 2 3 5 
One group rules  6 3 2 1 5 
Partition 3 5 2 12 4 
 
The largest percentage among whites, blacks and coloureds favour a ruling winning 
party with the non-winning parties in the opposition. By and large the most favoured 
option conforms to the political dispensation at the time of the survey.  
Although numbers are small, almost seven in ten Indians favour the power-sharing 
solution over the winner-takes-all solution. In 1994, the government of national unity 
(GNU) with the African National Congress, the National Party and the Inkatha Free-
dom Party was formed as a power-sharing solution. The National Party then broke 
away from the GNU in 1996 to become an opposition party.  
Some 12 percent of whites would prefer partition, the most radical solution to pre-
serving peace in a multicultural society. This is the solution that has been rejected by 
continuous oversight on the part of the ruling ANC government.  
All other options of political regulation attract less than 10 percent of votes.  
The South African miracle refers to the country’s transition to democracy that 
avoided bloodshed. Political violence was rife before the settlement. How do res-
pondents view violence in the new era? 
 
Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle. 
 
Just over two thirds (67%) agree that violence and killing is indefensible. Some 85 
percent of Indians, 78 percent of whites, 71 percent of coloureds and 65 percent of 
blacks condemn political violence. There is a tendency among the better educated to 
distance oneself from violence. Over 90 percent of Hindus, and four in five Anglicans 
condemn violence as well as above-average percentages among members of the 
mainline Christian churches and Muslims. Over 80 percent of Xhosa speakers and 
residents of the Eastern Cape dissociate themselves from political violence.  
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Respondents who are prepared to support political violence are found mainly in the 
rural areas and among unskilled workers and low-income households. Support for 
violence appears to be concentrated in the northeast of the country, in the provinces of 
Mpumalanga and Limpopo and among the Pedi and some of the minority ethnic 
groups living in the region including the Tsonga, Venda and the Swazi.  
Are there any situations where breaking the law might be condoned? The following 
statement intimated there might be exceptions: 
 
It is permissible to break the law if it is in the interest of my family. 
 
Exactly two thirds disagree. Those who rule out exceptions and excuses for breaking 
the law tend to be respondents living in towns and metropolitan areas, in the highest 
income bracket, and English speakers. By ethnicity and religion, Sesotho and Zulu 
speakers, and Hindus are least inclined to consider breaking the law.  
However, above-average percentages of students and younger respondents think 
it is permissible to break the law if one’s family would benefit.  Support for bending the 
law in the interest of the family increases progressively with decreasing age. Other 
categories that indicate they would consider breaking the law for their families include 
residents of former coloured areas, hostels and tribal authority areas. Noteworthy is 
that above-average percentages among persons reporting no income are prepared to 
risk breaking the law for their families. This result suggests that some respondents 
might consider theft a legitimate solution to poverty alleviation in an unequal society.  
What policies do respondents believe are best for their country? 
The following set of statements was put to respondents:  
 
 Agree 
A government that allows one state language only. 18 
Or:  
A government that gives everybody the right to use his/her 
own language in public, in offices, courts and parliament. 
82 
A government that tries to make all people as equal as 
possible in wages, housing and education, even if incomes 
are heavily taxed. 
70 
Or:  
A government that allows people who are clever and work 
hard to become wealthier than others, even if some remain 
permanently poor.  
30 
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continued Agree 
Local authorities that are elected by the people of the 
respective regions, towns or villages. 
69 
Or:  
Local authorities that are appointed by central government. 31 
Shops and factories owned by private business people who 
will work hard to make the businesses grow. 
66 
Or:  
Shops and factories owned by a government elected by the 
people. 
34 
 
Respondents have the strongest feelings about language rights and equity. Majorities 
believe in private business ownership and elected regional authorities.  
Some 82 percent of respondents believe that everyone should be allowed to speak 
their own language in public – a belief that is entrenched in the country’s new 
constitution. The strongest supporters of a multiple language policy are found among 
respondents whose home languages are Afrikaans, isiZulu, isiXhosa and Setswana.  
In practice, it is near impossible to give equal weight to the eleven languages that 
were made official in 1994. Most official documentation is in English although direc-
tives have been issued to promote an additional regional language alongside English. 
One fifth of blacks support one official state language followed by 12 percent of whites, 
11 percent of Indians and 9 percent of coloureds. Supporters of a single language 
policy are concentrated in metropolitan Gauteng, as well as in tribal authority areas, 
mainly those in the northeast including Limpopo and Mpumalanga.    
Earlier on respondents identified equity issues as the most pressing ones for the 
country. In response to the second set of statements, 70 percent would support a more 
socialist welfare policy in preference to the capitalist option. Groupings that stand most 
to gain from socialist state interventions are the strongest supporters of a government 
that seeks to equalise access to wages, housing and education. These include mainly 
the rural and urban poor, the unemployed and housewives. Support for opportunities 
for entrepreneurs to advance ahead of others come mainly from residents in metro-
politan areas, people with higher education, the professional and service sectors, and 
the richest provinces of Gauteng and the Western Cape. Endorsement of the state-
ment on a capitalist policy increases progressively with rising personal income. 
Over two thirds are of the opinion that local authorities should be elected rather 
than appointed by central government. The regional power option is supported by 69 
percent of all respondents, and 84 percent of whites, 74 percent of coloureds, 68 
percent of Indians, and 67 percent of blacks. Residents in urban and metropolitan 
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areas favour elected leaders. Preference for elected local authorities increases pro-
gressively with household and personal income.  
Respondents in rural areas and marginal urban categories such as squatters and 
hostel dwellers favour local authorities appointed by central government. Zulus and the 
minority Ndebele are most in favour of government-appointed local authorities.  
Two thirds approve of private rather than state control of businesses. Support for 
private ownership increases progressively with 61 percent of blacks in favour, 75 per-
cent of coloureds, 83 percent of Indians, and 90 percent of whites. Endorsement of a 
private ownership policy is above average in the Western Cape, among professionals 
and managers, artisans and skilled manual workers, and among persons with higher 
education. Approval for private control of business increases systematically with rising 
household and personal income. By language, English speakers are for private 
ownership; by religion Anglicans, Muslims and Hindus vote in favour.   
What roles do respondents see for civil society and trade unions in a democracy? 
Two statements explored respondents’ views:    
 
Here are statements that describe different ways in which a society 
can be governed. Which could you agree with? 
 
 
 
Agree 
A government that is influenced by all sorts of organisations and 
movements and associations of ordinary private people. 
70 
Or:  
A government that listens only to organisations that support it. 30 
Trade unions that are guided by government so that their demands 
meet the public interest. 
50 
Or:   
Trade unions that are free to negotiate whatever they think to be in 
their members’ interests. 
50 
 
Seven in ten opt for a government that is willing to entertain the views of a strong civil 
society. In favour of an influential civil society are mainly respondents living in metro-
politan areas and persons with a higher education. Support for the option of a strong 
civil society increases with rising income. Women tend to feel stronger than men about 
civil society having a voice.   
Only 30 percent opt for a government that is deaf to dissenting voices. Above 
average support for a government that has selective hearing comes from rural res-
pondents, Tswanas and respondents living in the northwest in the provinces of the 
Northern Cape and the North West, and persons with no religious affiliation.  
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Opinions are divided equally when it comes to the independence of trade unions. 
What might play an important role in shaping responses to trade union issues is the 
fact that the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) is one of the ruling 
African National Congress alliance partners. Above average support for trade unions 
independent of government comes from respondents in the metropolitan areas, parti-
cularly respondents living in the former Indian suburbs, and English speakers. Resi-
dents in the central west regions of the country in the provinces of the Free State and 
the North West tend to support the independence of trade unions. In contrast, Tsongas 
and Pedis in the adjoining provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga in the north east 
and in KwaZuluNatal in the south are more likely to think trade unions should tow the 
government line.  
Do respondents believe that some groups in society should receive preferential 
treatment to make up for iniquities and discrimination in the past?  
 
Thinking of the policies of different groups of people in South Africa, how should 
important positions be filled? With  . . . 
 
  
People I 
know and 
trust 
People 
mainly from 
my own 
group 
 
Fair 
representation of 
all groups 
The best, 
most 
capable 
people 
Senior jobs in govern-
ment services 
16 7 27 50 
Senior jobs in business, 
the private sector 
10 8 27 55 
The cabinet of the 
country 
10 7 27 56 
 
Over half state that appointments in senior government service, in the private sector 
and in cabinet should be made on merit. Just over a quarter believe in quotas to 
achieve fairer representation of groups in society. Less than one in five state they 
would prefer trusted people or people from their own group to be selected for important 
positions.  
The pattern of responses is fairly similar for positions in the public and private 
arena. However, a substantial proportion, 16 percent, would like to see known and 
trusted persons appointed to civil servant positions.  
All race groups agree on the rank order of preference for filling important positions. 
Preference for appointment on merit is followed at a distance by appointment in terms 
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of equity, trust and group membership. The following table averages the percentages 
voting for each of the four principles of appointment over the three types of positions 
by race. The vote for appointments on merit progresses steadily from 45 percent 
among blacks up to 82 percent among whites.   
 
 
      Race Group  
 
Blacks Coloured Indian White     Ø 
Appointment   
     
Merit 45-53 57-58 62-68 76-82 50-56 
Fair representation 28-29 29-34 23-28 10-14 27 
Known and trusted  11-19 5-10 4-9 5-7 10-16 
Member of own group 8-9 2-6          2 3-4 7-8 
 
Appointment on merit appeals to metropolitan dwellers, and increases with age, 
education and income. It finds least favour among the unemployed and economically 
inactive. Whites tend to be the staunchest supporters of merit appointments, blacks 
the weakest supporters, with Indians and coloureds falling in between. 
Equity principles of fair representation of all groups in important jobs is considered 
important in rural areas. Above-average percentages of Pedi and Mpumalanga resi-
dents consistently vote for a representative allocation of important jobs. It is also ap-
parent that a substantial proportion of coloured people favour quotas to protect mino-
rity access to positions of influence. 
Blacks are over-represented among those who recommend that members of their 
own group and known and trusted persons, such as friends and relatives, be ap-
pointed to important positions. In the case of civil service positions, filling staff vacan-
cies with known and trusted candidates is particularly important to blacks in urban and 
tribal areas and also to Roman Catholics and Sesotho speakers.  
How do respondents feel about living in a country with diverse cultures, religions 
and ethnic groups?   
 
In the present conflicts of our country all sides concerned should seek com-
promises and try to find agreement. 
 
Over nine in ten (92%) agree that compromise is the best way to manage conflict 
situations. Virtually all whites, Indians and coloureds support the compromise route 
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while 91 percent of blacks do so. Poverty might suppress the willingness to compro-
mise in conflict situations. Support for the statement increases systematically with per-
sonal income while below-average support is found among respondents from house-
holds with no or very low incomes. Sepedi speakers and respondents from Limpopo, 
one of the poorest provinces, are less likely to endorse the compromise solution.  
 
Whether one likes it or not, when groups with different languages, religions, 
colours or other differences live in one country, one group will either control 
others or be controlled.  
 
Just over two thirds (68%) agree. An above-average 83 percent of Indians and three 
quarters of whites agree. Respondents living in metropolitan areas, in the former 
Indian suburbs, and in rural areas are more likely than others to believe that a domi-
nant group will inevitably take control in multicultural societies. Over four in five 
Tswanas and residents of North West Province believe that the strongest group will 
take control compared to only slightly over half in Mpumalanga.  
  
Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as 
they are and respect each other’s rights. 
 
On average, 81 percent agree. Over 90 percent of Indians and coloureds agree, 
followed by 81 percent of blacks and 77 percent of whites. Acceptance and respect for 
difference increases progressively with household income. Sceptics are found mainly 
in the rural and tribal areas and in the provinces of Limpopo, the Free State and 
KwaZuluNatal. Over one fifth of Pedi, Zulu, Tsongas, and Vendas disagree with the 
statement, as do persons without a religious affiliation.  
 
Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting. 
 
A majority of 70 percent consider ethnic diversity to be advantageous for a country. 
Opinions differ by race. Ethnic diversity enriches according to 83 percent of whites, 82 
percent of Indians, 69 percent of coloureds and 68 percent of blacks. Acceptance of 
ethnic diversity increases systematically with household and personal income and is 
above average in urban and metropolitan areas. Residents of Mpumalanga, a pro-
vince that has experienced social tensions since 1994, are among those least likely to 
hold positive views of ethnic diversity.  
How firmly have democratic values taken root after eight years of democratic rule?  
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A scale of democracy was constructed by totalling scores on select items dis-
cussed in this chapter. The items in the scale included support for a multiparty demo-
cracy
23
 rather than  dominant
24
 or unopposed single party rule
25
, and support for a free 
press
26
, group rights
27
 and ethnic diversity
28
.  
Scores were assigned from 0 to 10 with the top scores going to individuals who 
espoused the largest number of democratic values.  
 
Democracy Index Scores  
Not democratic (0-2) 6 
A little democratic (3-4) 13 
Almost a democrat (5-6) 25 
Democratic (7-8) 29 
Very democratic (9-10) 27 
 
Over half achieve high marks on the democracy test; 56 percent score at least 7 out of 
10 and can be regarded as good democrats.  
Response patterns suggest that education and exposure to democratic practice 
play an important role in shaping political attitudes. Scores on the democracy index 
increase systematically with higher socio-economic status as indicated by occupational 
rank, education and personal income. Older persons tend to be more democratically 
inclined than younger persons. Survey categories that characterise veteran voters 
attract higher scores. Above average percentages of English, Afrikaans and bilingual 
Afrikaans and English speakers rank as ‘democratic’ and ‘very democratic’ as do res-
pondents living in the Free State and the Western Cape. Among speakers of African 
languages, Southern and Western Sothos rank highest on the democracy index. Zulus 
are overrepresented among the low scorers who express no or only a few democratic 
ideals.   
Newly enfranchised blacks generally score lowest on the democracy index; veteran 
white voters score highest, and coloureds and Indians score in between.  
                                                 
23
  Agrees: More than one party, each with its own plan for the country’s future. 
24
  Disagrees: One group rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this have to 
keep quiet or leave.  
25
  Disagrees: A single party open to everyone rules without opposition.  
26
  Agrees: Newspapers free to criticise government and enjoy freedom of expression.  
27
  Agrees: Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they 
are and respect each other’s mutual rights. 
28
  Agrees: Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting. 
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                                   Race Group 
 Black Coloured Indian White       Ø 
Not democratic 7 4 2 1 6 
A little democratic  15 7 10 7 13 
Almost a democrat 27 18 21 18 25 
Democratic 26 44 40 32 29 
Very democratic 25 27 28 42 27 
 
How do sociocultural values relate to democratic ones? Which attitudes and beliefs 
underpin democratic values?  
Trust is considered the hallmark of a functioning democracy. Therefore one might 
expect trust and democracy to go hand in hand. Survey results do not support this 
notion. The association between the trust index, introduced earlier, and the democracy 
index is tenuous. If anything, the group of respondents least inclined to support demo-
cratic ideals are more trusting than others.  
Religiosity is a different matter. There is a fairly strong positive association between 
the religiosity index, introduced earlier, and the democracy index. Some 30 percent of  
respondents who are classified as ‘not’ or only ‘a little’ religious on the religiosity index 
also score low on the democracy index, that is, are classified as ‘not’ or only a ‘little’ 
democratic. Conversely, some 34 percent of the ‘very religious’ are also ‘very demo-
cratic’ and a further 32 percent are ‘democratic’.  
To sum up, majorities endorse basic democratic principles such as freedom of ex-
pression, an independent judiciary and an accountable government. There is majority 
support for an open society that supports cultural diversity and free enterprise. Res-
pondents’ top priorities for a functioning democracy include an honest government and 
a strong civil society. Respondents are well versed in conflict regulation to achieve 
harmony in a multicultural society. Cultural diversity is viewed as a blessing rather than 
a burden. However, respondents vacillate when it comes to choosing between a 
power-sharing arrangement and majority rule. They also harbour serious doubts about 
the role of an opposition in a multiparty democracy and the merits of allowing too many 
individual freedoms that might harm solidarity. The spectre of inequality and poverty 
appears to shape views on state regulation: dependence on state welfare may be 
preferable to exploitation by the private sector.  
An earlier chapter found that religiosity promotes trust in society. In this chapter we 
learn that religiosity may also foster democratic ideals. One in two respondents 
achieve good marks on a ‘democracy test’. Ironically, veteran voters from a less demo-
cratic era emerge as those most likely to espouse democratic values under the new 
political order. Obviously there is room for democracy education and further debate on 
political issues to strengthen the new democracy.   
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Happiness in Democracy 
 
 
Has the coming of democracy to South African improved the quality of life of ordinary 
citizens and created happiness? This final chapter reviews several items designed to 
probe how South Africans assess their lives and their expectations for quality of life in 
future.  
Respondents in the survey were asked to consider their lives now and in ten years' 
time as follows: 
 
Thinking about life in South Africa for people like yourself, how do you feel: . . .? 
How do you think you will feel in 10 years' time: . . .? 
 
Responses were distributed as follows: 
 
 Satisfaction  
at present 
Projected 
satisfaction in 
ten year's time 
Very satisfied with life as it is 9 16 
Just satisfied but not very satisfied with life 
as it is 
30 30 
Not satisfied but also not dissatisfied –  
in the middle 
24 26 
Dissatisfied with life as it is 28 19 
Angry and impatient with life as it is 9 9 
 
 
Thinking about life in South Africa for people like yourself, how do you feel? 
 
There is a near perfect correspondence of current satisfaction with life and South 
Africa's racial hierarchy. There is a systematic increase in satisfaction from 36 percent 
'very satisfied and satisfied' among blacks, to 43 percent among coloureds, 47 percent 
among Indians and 54 percent among whites. Conversely, some 40 percent of blacks 
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are 'dissatisfied, angry and impatient', compared to 38 percent among coloureds, 20 
percent among Indians, and 18 percent among whites. 
Current satisfaction is highest in towns, cities and metropolitan areas while 'dis-
satisfaction, anger and impatience' is highest in the rural areas. Squatters and hostel 
dwellers are also more dissatisfied than others. Generally, unskilled workers, and in 
particular miners, transport workers, and the unemployed are disenchanted with life in 
South Africa.  
Material circumstances are linked to perceptions of a better life in the present. A 
positive assessment of quality of life increases systematically with both household and 
personal income. Persons from households that have access to conveniences such as 
piped water, electricity, and a flush toilet, indicate higher current satisfaction with life 
than others. A more comprehensive measure of living standards produces similar 
results. The Living Standards Measure
29
 is widely regarded as a fair and racially un-
biased measure of levels of living in the new South Africa. The LSM index, whose con-
tents are regularly updated, is based on a list of items which are thought to make up 
the good life in the material sense. In our survey, current satisfaction with life rises 
systematically with living standard as measured by the LSM. The proportion of satis-
fied is only between 28 and 34 percent at the bottom end of the LSM scale (scores 1 
through 5) and rises to between 54 and 59 percent satisfied at the top of the scale 
(scores from 8 to 10). While only between 12 and 18 percent are dissatisfied at the top 
of the scale, the proportion dissatisfied increases to between 42 and 47 percent at the 
lowest standard of living. 
By province the currently most satisfied provinces are the Western and Eastern 
Cape, the most 'dissatisfied, angry and impatient' are Mpumalanga and the North 
West. Satisfaction with life is above average among English, Afrikaans and Xhosa 
speakers. 'Net' satisfaction
30
 is highest among English speakers. ‘Net’ dissatisfaction31 
is highest among Zulu speakers followed by Western Sotho and the minority Tsonga 
speakers. 
                                                 
29
  The Living Standards Measure (LSM), compiled by the South African Advertising Research 
Foundation, measures the socio-economic status of an individual or group. A cluster of some 
20 or more variables are used to measure the respondents' lifestyles, including items such 
as car ownership, ownership of household appliances including refrigerator and washing 
machine, ownership of radios and a television set, amenities in the home such as hot 
running water and flush toilet, a telephone in the home or a cellular phone. Based on results, 
respondents are usually divided into eight LSM categories.  The version of LSM used in this 
study distinguishes between 10 LSM categories with LSM 1 being the lowest (or poorest) 
standard of living category and LSM10 the highest (or most prosperous).  
30
  Calculated by subtracting the percentages indicating dissatisfaction from the percentages 
indicating satisfaction.  
31
  Calculated by subtracting the percentages indicating satisfaction from the percentages 
indicating dissatisfaction. 
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Members of the Dutch Reformed churches, Muslims and Hindus state they are 
mainly satisfied at present. 'Net' dissatisfaction is highest among Roman Catholics 
with 43 percent dissatisfied and only 31 percent satisfied. Members of African Inde-
pendent Churches, religious movements and persons with no religious denomination 
also report above-average dissatisfaction.  
 
How do you think you will feel in 10 years' time: . . .? 
 
Regarding projections for life satisfaction in future, optimism outweighs pessimism. 
There are twice as many optimistic whites and coloureds than pessimists: 52 and 51 
percent optimists to 20 percent pessimists. Among blacks, 45 percent are optimistic 
compared to 30 pessimistic. Among Indians the comparative percentages are 40 to 25.  
Optimism rises systematically with increasing household and personal income. 
'Net' optimism
32
 is most widespread in the urban areas and among the highest-ranking 
occupations. Young people are more likely than older people to project satisfaction on 
the future. Three times as many students and schoolgoers are confident rather than 
pessimistic about the future.   
By province, the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape and to a slightly lesser degree, 
the Northern Cape are most confident in a better life in future. Only Mpumalanga is 
sceptical. Optimism is most pronounced among Xhosa and Venda speakers. Between 
40 and 45 percent of the minority Swazi and Tsonga speakers think they will be 
dissatisfied or angry in ten years' time.  
By religion, Anglicans, Dutch Reformed, Muslims and Baptists – all religious deno-
minations with better-off members, project mainly satisfaction onto the future. The ver-
dict is split among members of religious movements. Approximately a third expects to 
be satisfied in future while another third anticipates future dissatisfaction. 
Two further indicators inquired how respondents rate their life at present. Both 
items are ones that have been put to South Africans in intervals over the past twenty 
years: 
 
Taking all things together, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days? Generally speaking, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? 
Taking all things together in your life, how would you say things are these days? 
Would you say you are very happy, fairly happy, fairly unhappy or very unhappy? 
                                                 
32
  Calculated by subtracting the percentages projecting future dissatisfaction from the per-
centages projecting future satisfaction.  
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The evaluation of overall life satisfaction was put to respondents right at the beginning 
of the interview, the item on global happiness at the very end. The distribution over the 
response categories and an ambivalent mid-point is as follows: 
 
 Satisfied with life Happy 
Very satisfied/happy 8 7 
Satisfied/happy 35 36 
Neither, nor 16 23 
Dissatisfied/happy 25 21 
Very dissatisfied/happy 16 13 
 
The proportions satisfied and happy with their lives are very similar. Satisfaction is 
thought to be the more cognitive, rational assessment while happiness is considered 
to be the more affective or emotional one. As might be expected, the more emotional 
evaluation in terms of happiness is, on average, slightly more positive.  
Current satisfaction with life-as-a-whole and global happiness increase systematic-
cally along the racial hierarchy imposed prior to democracy. A consistent pattern of 
satisfaction and happiness emerges if the two categories on either side of the ambi-
valent mid-point are grouped together.  
 
 Satisfied Dissatisfied  Happy Unhappy 
Black 37 46  38 39 
Coloured 58 28  56 24 
Indian 65 22  54 19 
White 68 18  69 12 
Ø 43 41  43 35 
 
Highest 'net' satisfaction and happiness occurs in towns, cities and metropolitan areas 
and in the former Indian suburbs. 'Net' happiness is also very high among the resi-
dents of the former coloured townships. Hostel dwellers, squatters and rural dwellers 
are among the most dissatisfied and unhappy with their situation. 
Individuals who are faring better than others in terms of formal education, occu-
pation and income are more satisfied and happier. In most cases life satisfaction and 
happiness increase systematically with occupational rank, years of education and 
household and personal earnings.  
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The provinces ranking highest on life satisfaction and happiness are the Western, 
Eastern and Northern Cape. Mpumalanga has by far the highest proportion of dis-
satisfied and unhappy citizens as well as the lowest proportion of satisfied and happy 
ones. Limpopo scores only somewhat better.  
The language groups associated with above-average life satisfaction and happi-
ness are English speakers and bilingual Afrikaans and English speakers. Afrikaans, 
Venda and Xhosa speakers are also predominantly satisfied and happy. Mainly 
dissatisfied are the minorities who speak Tsonga and Swazi as their home language. 
'Net' dissatisfaction and ‘net’ unhappiness is remarkably high among the large group of 
Zulu speakers.   
By religion, satisfaction and happiness is above average among Muslims, Hindus, 
and the Dutch Reformed. Members of the Baptist and the mainline Christian churches 
are predominantly satisfied with life. Anglicans are mostly satisfied and happy. In con-
trast, members of religious movements, African Independent Churches, Roman 
Catholics and persons with no religious denomination are predominantly dissatisfied.  
The three indicators of current satisfaction and happiness produce similar results. 
Obviously, the combination of 'anger and impatience' is the strongest reaction to a poli-
tical system that does not meet citizen needs and wants, followed by dissatisfaction. 
Unhappiness is more likely to be caused by difficult personal life circumstances rather 
than by public interventions in individual lives. However, all three indicators point to the 
importance of position in society for enhancing well-being. The projection of satis-
faction on the future is the prerogative of those who have been treated well by society. 
The currently satisfied and happy continue to project satisfaction and happiness into 
the future. Importantly, the young are well represented among the optimists. Students, 
in particular, seem to gain confidence that they are on the right track to achieving a 
'brighter future' 
The importance of the material underpinnings of life satisfaction is reflected in the 
strong association of levels of living with current and future well-being. This positive 
association cuts across the racial and cultural divides in the sense that the Living 
Standards Measure is a neutral one. On each of the four indicators of happiness and 
satisfaction in the table below, better-off South Africans express a more positive out-
look and contentment.  
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Average percentages satisfied/happy and dissatisfied, unhappy, angry or impatient  
with life now or in ten years time 
 Life now Life satisfaction Happiness Life in ten years' time 
LSM Satisfied Dissatis/ 
angry 
Satisfied Dissatis  Happy Unhappy  Satisfied Dissatis/ 
angry 
1-5 33 44 35 50 35 42 43 33 
6-7 45 30 49 30 52 27 50 22 
8-10 56 14 67 18 66 13 53 18 
   Living Standards Measure: 1 = lowest, 10 = highest standard of living 
 
Worth noting is that current inequalities of living standards appear to be of less im-
portance for projections of future satisfaction and discontent. In the far right column in 
the table above, the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' in terms of percentages 
satisfied and 'dissatisfied or angry' in future is much narrower than for the other three 
indicators of current quality of life.  
In conclusion, some eight years into democracy, the formerly disadvantaged 
groups in South African society are still searching for happiness and satisfaction in 
their lives. It is abundantly clear, that material conditions play an important role in 
citizens' evaluation of their quality of life. Freedom to vote was only the first step. Ordi-
nary South Africans now want a taste of the good life to fulfil their vision of the ideal 
democracy. 
All the cultural markers characteristic of current happiness and life satisfaction are 
ones that constitute better life chances or are associated with a higher living standard. 
The previously advantaged white South Africans still emerge as the most satisfied and 
happy, with Indians close behind. Black South Africans are still experiencing a hap-
piness deficit. Rising unemployment and economic deprivation have taken their toll. 
Encouraging, however, are signs that where the new government has managed to 
raise standards of living it has also planted the seeds of contentment, not only for the 
present but also for the future. Even more encouraging is that large proportions of 
South Africans expect to be more satisfied with life in future. A healthy sign is that 
young South Africans appear to be particularly optimistic. In earlier quality-of-life 
studies conducted during the eighties and nineties, it was mainly blacks that expected 
life to get better from a position of abject poverty and oppression, while whites, who 
had everything to lose, tended to be pessimists. Now whites share their black com-
patriots' optimism and Indians and coloureds are not far behind. Material living 
standards boost confidence in the future among all South Africans. Those who have 
reaped the material rewards under democracy face the future with confidence.  
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Concluding Comments 
 
South Africa’s democracy project must succeed. Its success is imperative if only to 
prove to the world that peaceful co-existence is possible in spite of the odds. Africa 
needs a strong democracy to lead by example.  
The survey findings reviewed in the preceding chapters suggest that the seeds of 
democracy have indeed taken root among ordinary South Africans. However, much 
still needs to be done judging by the scores achieved on the democracy index. Only 
every second South African scored as either ‘democratic’ or ‘very democratic’ on an  
index that measures endorsement of principles such as a multiparty system of demo-
cracy, freedom of expression, tolerance of difference, and appreciation of cultural di-
versity. Trust in fellow citizens and the institutions that make democracy work leave 
much to be desired. Nonetheless, the prospects of South Africans becoming better 
democrats in time appear to be good. Encouraging are the signs in the survey res-
ponse of unity of purpose, growing self-respect and respect for difference in society. 
Religion plays an important role in the lives of South Africans and appears to 
strengthen trust across social and cultural divides. Many of the indicators reviewed in 
this report suggest that the election euphoria of 1994 and the 1995 victory in the World 
Rugby Cup have given birth to a spirit of unity and reconciliation that has been re-
markably robust even if South Africa’s identity as ‘rainbow nation’ has faded. The rain-
bow symbol that signifies a united and reconciled nation is still regarded as the ideal if 
not the reality. South Africans still refer to Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first demo-
cratically elected president who has become an international symbol of freedom and 
reconciliation, as their leader. An honest government is a priority for the new South 
Africans. They recognise as moral authorities their church leaders many of whom have 
not shied away from criticising political injustice and corruption in society. Perhaps the 
most astonishing finding is how self confident South Africans have become in them-
selves and their country as evidenced in response to survey items on identity and refe-
rence comparisons. A strong sense of personal and national identity should provide a 
solid base from which to promote democratic ideals such as tolerance and mutual 
respect.  
Happy and discontented citizens 
Democracy is commonly associated with health, wealth and prosperity. Perhaps the 
greatest challenge to promoting democratic ideals is the expectation of a higher stan-
dard of living that have been raised during the transition to democracy. Western 
countries have projected the notion the democracy produces affluence and equality. 
However, South Africa remains an unequal society and economic prosperity has re-
mained illusive for South Africans in the lower ranks of society. Survey respondents 
are of the opinion that the divide between rich and poor has increased rather than 
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decreased under democracy. They identify poverty and unemployment as the most 
serious problems facing their country. Worrying is that the youth, who are generally 
optimistic about their future in the new South Africa, appear to have fewer scruples 
than others about resorting to illegitimate means as a way of securing a fair share of 
the economy for their families. Although attitudes do not necessarily translate into 
action, such misplaced entrepreneurial ambitions are not unimportant in a society that 
is suffering from jobless growth, high youth unemployment, and unacceptably high 
levels of crime.   
A contented citizenry is considered to be the hallmark of democracy. The new 
South Africans expected a better life under democracy. Therefore, it is disappointing 
that more recently enfranchised citizens are dissatisfied with life than are satisfied. It is 
true that the government of the African National Congress has built millions of houses 
and brought electricity and clean water to millions of South Africans in fulfilment of its 
election promises. Nonetheless, the infrastructure backlog inherited from the previous 
government is enormous. The growing pockets of discontent among citizens who feel 
they have been overlooked or short-changed is a threat to democracy. 
In spatial terms, the 2002 survey identified the discontented as rural residents living 
in the former homelands and farm workers on commercial farms whose economic 
situation has not changed much in the new era, as well as the hostel and shack 
dwellers in the urban areas; by religion, the economically weak members of the Zion 
Christian Church; and by ethnicity, the Zulus whose sense of personal pride has been 
dented under African National Congress rule. Survey responses attest to these groups’ 
disillusionment with leaders who are seen to be unwilling to listen to the voice of the 
people. The discontented are among those least likely to think their leaders have the 
capacity to effect positive change in society. They are currently dissatisfied with their 
lot and their future economic prospects. Nonetheless, the very fact that survey res-
pondents have no reservations in voicing their grievances may be taken as a sign that 
South African democracy is working. In a democratic society that espouses freedom of 
expression and association, citizens should feel free to express their dissatisfaction 
through legitimate channels that include opinion polls and the ballot box. 
Education for democracy 
Citizens in most of the established democracies enjoy relatively high levels of edu-
cation. The idea is close at hand that education may be a prerequisite for democratic 
ideas to flourish. Indeed, a leading idea that launched the international study of demo-
cracy was that education should make for better democrats. South Africa’s democracy 
study provides some tentative answers to the question whether education of the mas-
ses plays a significant role in the acceptance of a democratic system of governance.    
At the time of 2002 survey, only about one in eight South Africans have received 
twelve years of education and a further one in eight have benefited from some higher 
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education. However, levels of education levels have risen significantly with each 
generation.    
In support of the supposition that education and democracy go hand in hand, the 
better educated in the 2002 survey do indeed score higher on the democracy index. 
Throughout the survey, the better educated present themselves as leaders who are 
more critically aware, open-minded and tolerant. Increasing levels of education tend to 
be associated with less conservative attitudes. The better educated are less likely to 
express fear of social change and uncertainty. They try to live their lives according to 
their religious principles. They are more likely than others to be confident of their per-
sonal capabilities, more willing to take financial risks, and to embrace new ideas and 
entrepreneurship. They are supportive of personal freedoms and are more likely to 
place their trust in friends rather than kin. They support appointments to key positions 
in society on merit rather than on the basis of trust or kinship. They have faith in demo-
cratic institutions such as the law courts that play an important role in making demo-
cracy work. They consider an independent judiciary to be an important priority for 
South Africa and believe they have the right to hold their government accountable. Im-
portantly, in a multicultural society, they value friendships that cut across ethnic and 
religious lines and believe ethnic diversity is beneficial for society. Equally important 
given South Africa’s history of strife in the past, the better educated categorically reject 
the use of violence to settle any kind of dispute. 
Education is regarded as a passport to success in South African society. The better 
educated respondents in the 2002 survey enjoy higher living standards. They express 
greater job and income satisfaction and are confident of a positive future for their 
children. The youth, who tend to have received more formal education than their 
parents and grandparents are generally optimistic about the future which augurs well 
for South Africa’s democracy project.  
In contrast, the poorly educated tend to score low on the democracy index. 
Concentration of the poorly educated who are less democratic are found among low 
income earners, in the rural areas, and among members of African Independent Chur-
ches, precisely among the groupings that express the highest levels of disillusionment 
with political leaders and discontent with their life chances in the democratic era. 
Particularly striking is the disaffection of Zulus, the largest ethnic group in South Africa, 
which has been politically sidelined since 1994. Of significance for the analysis here is 
that Zulus are among those who score lowest on the democracy index. Noteworthy 
also is that some of the disaffected groups  - Zulus, and hostel and shack dwellers – 
score very low on the religiosity index which is associated with higher levels of trust in 
fellow South Africans.   
Informal education and democracy 
Perhaps it is short-sighted to focus merely on formal school education as a crucial 
factor in promoting democracy. In the run-up to the first open elections in 1994, 
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numerous organisations provided education in civics to new voters. Since 1994 South 
Africans have been exposed to a wide range of public awareness and education cam-
paigns at all levels of society. Radio and television, which reach most of the population 
even in remote areas, devote many hours in the day to ‘infotainment’ that combines 
information and education with entertainment. Talk shows with panels of experts 
educate the general public on civics, health, finance, the law, and all manner of topical 
and development issues until late at night. Many South Africans, including individuals 
whose schooling was neglected in the era of Bantu education, are now receiving 
informal as well as formal adult education on a daily basis. It appears that this con-
tinuing adult education programme may have promoted some of the ideals of co-
existence that are now taken for granted. The next generation growing up in South 
Africa may never question that a person should be judged according to character 
rather than skin colour.  
Metropolitan dwellers, who are more likely to be better educated, often act as trend-
setters in accepting novel ideas and fashions. It is therefore likely that urbanisation 
may rival education in promoting democratic ideals. In the 2002 survey, residents of 
South Africa’s metropolitan areas are among the most politically aware and tend to be 
more enterprising, more open to progressive ideas and supportive of democratic 
principles. The fact that South Africa, whose wealth was established in agriculture and 
mining, is fast becoming an urban society may assist in advancing the country’s demo-
cracy project. 
At the same time, proximity to wealth and opportunities in urban areas may also 
become a breeding ground for the discontent and cynicism which may hinder progress 
with the democracy project. The marginal urbanites, the hostel and shack dwellers, are 
a case in point. They are more likely than others to indulge in envious social compare-
sons to fuel their discontent.  
The new democrats?  
As is evident from our survey findings, wealth, education and happiness are inter-
twined in the case of the emergent black middle class. The question is whether edu-
cation or income is the driving force behind the promotion of democratic ideals. It is 
commonly assumed that it is easier to be magnanimous and peace loving when living 
in affluence than in poverty. The 2002 survey evidence shows that higher education is 
associated with greater openness and tolerance. At the same time, higher levels of 
education and income are both associated with higher scores on the democracy index. 
As it is near impossible to disentangle education and income as markers of social 
status in the 2002 survey, it is uncertain whether income or education does the most 
work in shaping progressive and democratic ideals.  
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A separate analysis of the 2002 survey results reported in an earlier bulletin
33 
found 
that the new black economic elite, which is better educated than most South Africans, 
shares some but not all views with veteran voters who scored highest on the 
democracy index. Consider that members of the upwardly mobile black middle class 
are smugly satisfied with their social standing in the democratic era. They are brashly 
self confident and mix with ease with all South Africans. In contrast to the disillusion-
ment and discontent found among the economically and politically marginalised, mem-
bers of the new black middle class are optimists who expect to continue to reap the 
rewards of democracy in future. It does not seem implausible to project that the better-
educated emergent black middle class is cut out to become the new breed of demo-
crats in South Africa. 
Outlook 
The fourth national elections may be the proving ground for South Africa’s new 
democracy. It is predicted that the next national elections to be held in 2009 will be 
hotly contested not only by the opposition parties but also by the alliance partners of 
the ruling African National Congress. The acid test will be whether all parties contest-
ing the elections will stick to the rules of the game, or bend them to suit their own 
interests, or possibly even resort to illegal and violent means to retain or gain power.  
In 2002, the socio-economic divides are still overlaid by racial ones. Judging by the 
hypothetical election results produced by our survey, political polls remain a racial 
census. Equally worrying for the future of democracy in South Africa is unconditional 
loyalty to political leaders that does not mix well with a multiparty system of 
democracy. In the 2002 survey, approximately four in ten South Africans are prepared 
to give their vote to an ineffective leader rather than to vote for the opposition. Equally 
problematic would be the scenario in which disillusioned citizens abstain from exer-
cising their right to vote. In the 2002 survey, Zulus count among the most disenchanted 
voters who said they would not go to the polls.  
Future rounds of surveys for the South African democracy project will tell whether 
such misgivings are misplaced. At present, one in two South Africans is a good demo-
crat. The 2002 survey suggests that it would not be imprudent to place our bets on the 
new generation of better educated and contented South Africans to swell the ranks of 
good democrats. Whether this scenario will become reality is a question for future 
research.   
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